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ABSTRACT
The returns to hedge funds and other alternative investments are often highly serially correlated in
sharp contrast to the returns of more traditional investment vehicles such as long-only equity
portfolios and mutual funds. In this paper, we explore several sources of such serial correlation and
show that the most likely explanation is illiquidity exposure, i.e., investments in securities that are
not actively traded and for which market prices are not always readily available. For portfolios of
illiquid securities, reported returns will tend to be smoother than true economic returns, which will
understate volatility and increase risk-adjusted performance measures such as the Sharpe ratio. We
propose an econometric model of illiquidity exposure and develop estimators for the smoothing
profile as well as a smoothing-adjusted Sharpe ratio. For a sample of 908 hedge funds drawn from
the TASS database, we show that our estimated smoothing coefficients vary considerably across
hedge-fund style categories and may be a useful proxy for quantifying illiquidity exposure.
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One of the fastest growing sectors of the nancial services industry is the hedge-fund or
\alternative investments" sector. Long the province of foundations, family oces, and high-
net-worth investors, hedge funds are now attracting major institutional investors such as
large state and corporate pension funds and university endowments, and eorts are underway
to make hedge-fund investments available to individual investors through more traditional
mutual-fund investment vehicles. One of the main reasons for such interest is the per-
formance characteristics of hedge funds|often known as \high-octane investments", hedge
funds typically yield double-digit returns to their investors and, in some cases, in a fashion
that is uncorrelated with general market swings and with relatively low volatility. Most
hedge funds accomplish this by maintaining both long and short positions in securities|
hence the term \hedge" fund|which, in principle, gives investors an opportunity to prot
from both positive and negative information while, at the same time, providing some degree
of \market neutrality" because of the simultaneous long and short positions.
However, several recent empirical studies have challenged these characterizations of hedge-
fund returns, arguing that the standard methods of assessing the risk and reward of hedge-
fund investments may be misleading. For example, Asness, Krail and Liew (2001) show in
some cases where hedge funds purport to be market neutral, i.e., funds with relatively small
market betas, including both contemporaneous and lagged market returns as regressors and
summing the coecients yields signicantly higher market exposure. Moreover, in deriving
statistical estimators for Sharpe ratios of a sample of mutual and hedge funds, Lo (2002)
shows that the correct method for computing annual Sharpe ratios based on monthly means
and standard deviations can yield point estimates that dier from the naive Sharpe ratio
estimator by as much as 70%.
These empirical properties may have potentially signicant implications for assessing the
risks and expected returns of hedge-fund investments, and can be traced to a single common
source: signicant serial correlation in their returns.
This may come as some surprise because serial correlation is often (though incorrectly)
associated with market ineciencies, implying a violation of the Random Walk Hypothe-
sis and the presence of predictability in returns. This seems inconsistent with the popular
belief that the hedge-fund industry attracts the best and the brightest fund managers in
the nancial services sector. In particular, if a fund manager's returns are predictable, the
implication is that the manager's investment policy is not optimal; if his returns next month
can be reliably forecasted to be positive, he should increase his positions this month to take
advantage of this forecast, and vice versa for the opposite forecast. By taking advantage of
1such predictability the fund manager will eventually eliminate it, along the lines of Samuel-
son's (1965) original \proof that properly anticipated prices 
uctuate randomly". Given
the outsized nancial incentives of hedge-fund managers to produce protable investment
strategies, the existence of signicant unexploited sources of predictability seems unlikely.
In this paper, we argue that in most cases, serial correlation in hedge-fund returns is
not due to unexploited prot opportunities, but is more likely the result of illiquid securities
that are contained in the fund, i.e., securities that are not actively traded and for which
market prices are not always readily available. In such cases, the reported returns of funds
containing illiquid securities will appear to be smoother than true economic returns|returns
that fully re
ect all available market information concerning those securities|and this, in
turn, will impart a downward bias on the estimated return variance and yield positive serial
return correlation.
The prospect of spurious serial correlation and biased sample moments in reported returns
is not new. Such eects have been derived and empirically documented extensively in the
literature on \nonsynchronous trading", which refers to security prices set at dierent times
are treated as if they were sampled simultaneously.1 However, this literature has focused ex-
clusively on equity market-microstructure eects as the sources of nonsynchronicity|closing
prices that are set at dierent times, or prices that are stale|where the temporal displace-
ment is on the order of minutes, hours, or, in extreme cases, several days.2 In the context of
hedge funds, we argue in this paper that serial correlation is the outcome of illiquidity ex-
posure, and while nonsynchronous trading may be one symptom or by-product of illiquidity,
it is not the only aspect of illiquidity that aects hedge-fund returns. Even if prices were
sampled synchronously, they may still yield highly serially correlated returns if the securities
1 For example, the daily prices of nancial securities quoted in the Wall Street Journal are usually
\closing" prices, prices at which the last transaction in each of those securities occurred on the previous
business day. If the last transaction in security A occurs at 2:00pm and the last transaction in security B
occurs at 4:00pm, then included in B's closing price is information not available when A's closing price was
set. This can create spurious serial correlation in asset returns since economy-wide shocks will be re
ected
rst in the prices of the most frequently traded securities, with less frequently traded stocks responding with
a lag. Even when there is no statistical relation between securities A and B, their reported returns will
appear to be serially correlated and cross-correlated simply because we have mistakenly assumed that they
are measured simultaneously. One of the rst to recognize the potential impact of nonsynchronous price
quotes was Fisher (1966). Since then more explicit models of non-trading have been developed by Atchison,
Butler, and Simonds (1987), Dimson (1979), Cohen, Hawawini, et al. (1983a,b), Shanken (1987), Cohen,
Maier, et al. (1978, 1979, 1986), Kadlec and Patterson (1999), Lo and MacKinlay (1988, 1990), and Scholes
and Williams (1977). See Campbell, Lo, and MacKinlay (1997, Chapter 3) for a more detailed review of this
literature.
2For such application, Lo and MacKinlay (1988, 1990) and Kadlec and Patterson (1999) show that
nonsynchronous trading cannot explain all of the serial correlation in weekly returns of equal- and value-
weighted portfolios of US equities during the past three decades.
2are not actively traded.3 Therefore, although our formal econometric model of illiquidity
is similar to those in the nonsynchronous trading literature, the motivation is considerably
broader|linear extrapolation of prices for thinly traded securities, the use of smoothed
broker-dealer quotes, trading restrictions arising from control positions and other regula-
tory requirements, and, in some cases, deliberate performance-smoothing behavior|and the
corresponding interpretations of the parameter estimates must be modied accordingly.
Regardless of the particular mechanism by which hedge-fund returns are smoothed and
serial correlation is induced, the common theme and underlying driver is illiquidity exposure.
In this paper, we develop an explicit econometric model of smoothed returns and derive its
implications for common performance statistics such as the mean, standard deviation, and
Sharpe ratio. We nd that the induced serial correlation and impact on the Sharpe ratio
can be quite signicant even for mild forms of smoothing. We estimate the model using
historical hedge-fund returns from the TASS Database, and show how to infer the true risk
exposures of a smoothed fund for a given smoothing prole. Our empirical ndings are quite
intuitive: funds with the highest serial correlation tend to be the more illiquid funds, e.g.,
emerging market debt, xed income, etc., and after correcting for the eects of smoothed
returns, some of the most successful types of funds tend to have considerably less attractive
performance characteristics.
Before describing our econometric model of smoothed returns, we provide a brief literature
review in Section 2 and then consider other potential sources of serial correlation in hedge-
fund returns in Section 3. We show that these other alternatives|time-varying expected
returns, time-varying leverage, and incentive fees with high-water marks|are unlikely to be
able to generate the magnitudes of serial correlation observed in the data. We develop a
model of smoothed returns in Section 4 and derive its implications for serial correlation in
observed returns, and we propose several methods for estimating the smoothing prole and
smoothing-adjusted Sharpe ratios in Section 5. We apply these methods to a dataset of 909
hedge funds spanning the period from November 1977 to January 2001 and summarize our
ndings in Section 6, and conclude in Section 7.
2 Literature Review
Thanks to the availability of hedge-fund returns data from sources such as AltVest, Hedge
Fund Research (HFR), Managed Account Reports (MAR), and TASS, a number of empirical
studies of hedge funds have been published recently. For example, Ackermann, McEnally,
3In fact, for most hedge funds, returns computed on a monthly basis, hence the pricing or \mark-to-
market" of a fund's securities typically occurs synchronously on the last day of the month.
3and Ravenscraft (1999), Agarwal and Naik (2000b, 2000c), Edwards and Caglayan (2001),
Fung and Hsieh (1999, 2000, 2001), Kao (2002), and Liang (1999, 2000, 2001) provide
comprehensive empirical studies of historical hedge-fund performance using various hedge-
fund databases. Agarwal and Naik (2000a), Brown and Goetzmann (2001), Brown, Goet-
zmann, and Ibbotson (1999), Brown, Goetzmann, and Park (1997, 2000, 2001), Fung and
Hsieh (1997a, 1997b), and Locho (2002) present more detailed performance attribution and
\style" analysis for hedge funds. None of these empirical studies focus directly on the serial
correlation in hedge-fund returns or the sources of such correlation.
However, several authors have examined the persistence of hedge-fund performance over
various time intervals, and such persistence may be indirectly linked to serial correlation,
e.g., persistence in performance usually implies positively autocorrelated returns. Agarwal
and Naik (2000c) examine the persistence of hedge-fund performance over quarterly, half-
yearly, and yearly intervals by examining the series of wins and losses for two, three, and
more consecutive time periods. Using net-of-fee returns, they nd that persistence is highest
at the quarterly horizon and decreases when moving to the yearly horizon. The authors also
nd that performance persistence, whenever present, is unrelated to the type of a hedge fund
strategy. Brown, Goetzmann, Ibbotson, and Ross (1992) show that survivorship gives rise
to biases in the rst and second moments and cross-moments of returns, and apparent per-
sistence in performance where there is dispersion of risk among the population of managers.
However, using annual returns of both defunct and currently operating oshore hedge funds
between 1989 and 1995, Brown, Goetzmann, and Ibbotson (1999) nd virtually no evidence
of performance persistence in raw returns or risk-adjusted returns, even after breaking funds
down according to their returns-based style classications. None of these studies considers
illiquidity and smoothed returns as a source of serial correlation in hedge-fund returns.
The ndings by Asness, Krail, and Liew (2001)|that lagged market returns are often
signicant explanatory variables for the returns of supposedly market-neutral hedge funds|
is closely related to serial correlation and smoothed returns, as we shall demonstrate in
Section 4. In particular, we show that even simple models of smoothed returns can explain
both serial correlation in hedge-fund returns and correlation between hedge-fund returns and
lagged index returns, and our empirically estimated smoothing proles imply lagged beta
coecients that are consistent with the lagged beta estimates reported in Asness, Krail, and
Liew (2001).
With respect to the deliberate smoothing of performance by managers, a recent study of
closed-end funds by Chandar and Bricker (2002) concludes that managers seem to use ac-
counting discretion in valuing restricted securities so as to optimize fund returns with respect
to a passive benchmark. Because mutual funds are highly regulated entities that are required
4to disclose considerably more information about their holdings than hedge funds, Chandar
and Bricker (2002) were able to perform a detailed analysis of the periodic adjustments|
both discretionary and non-discretionary|that fund managers made to the valuation of their
restricted securities. Their ndings suggest that performance smoothing may be even more
relevant in the hedge-fund industry which is not nearly as transparent, and that economet-
ric models of smoothed returns may be an important tool for detecting such behavior and
unraveling its eects on true economic returns.
3 Other Sources of Serial Correlation
Before turning to our econometric model of smoothed returns in Section 4, we rst consider
four other potential sources of serial correlation in asset returns: (1) market ineciencies;
(2) time-varying expected returns; (3) time-varying leverage; and (4) incentive fees with high
water marks.
Perhaps the most common explanation (at least among industry professionals) for the
presence of serial correlation in asset returns is a violation of the Ecient Markets Hypoth-
esis, one of the central pillars of modern nance theory. As with so many of the ideas of
modern economics, the origins of the Ecient Markets Hypothesis can be traced back to Paul
Samuelson (1965), whose contribution is neatly summarized by the title of his article: \Proof
that Properly Anticipated Prices Fluctuate Randomly". In an informationally ecient mar-
ket, price changes must be unforecastable if they are properly anticipated, i.e., if they fully
incorporate the expectations and information of all market participants. Fama (1970) opera-
tionalizes this hypothesis, which he summarizes in the well-known epithet \prices fully re
ect
all available information", by placing structure on various information sets available to mar-
ket participants. This concept of informational eciency has a wonderfully counter-intuitive
and seemingly contradictory 
avor to it: the more ecient the market, the more random
the sequence of price changes generated by such a market, and the most ecient market of
all is one in which price changes are completely random and unpredictable. This, of course,
is not an accident of Nature but is the direct result of many active participants attempting
to prot from their information. Unable to curtail their greed, an army of investors aggres-
sively pounce on even the smallest informational advantages at their disposal, and in doing
so, they incorporate their information into market prices and quickly eliminate the prot
opportunities that gave rise to their aggression. If this occurs instantaneously, which it must
in an idealized world of \frictionless" markets and costless trading, then prices must always
fully re
ect all available information and no prots can be garnered from information-based
5trading (because such prots have already been captured).
In the context of hedge-fund returns, one interpretation of the presence of serial corre-
lation is that the hedge-fund manager is not taking full advantage of the information or
\alpha" contained in his strategy. For example, if a manager's returns are highly positively
autocorrelated, then it should be possible for him to improve his performance by exploiting
this fact|in months where his performance is good, he should increase his bets in anticipa-
tion of continued good performance (due to positive serial correlation), and in months where
his performance is poor, he should reduce his bets accordingly. The reverse argument can be
made for the case of negative serial correlation. By taking advantage of serial correlation of
either sign in his returns, the hedge-fund manager will eventually eliminate it along the lines
of Samuelson (1965), i.e., properly anticipated hedge-fund returns should 
uctuate randomly.
And if this self-correcting mechanism of the Ecient Markets Hypothesis is at work among
any group of investors in the nancial community, it surely must be at work among hedge-
fund managers, which consists of a highly trained, highly motivated, and highly competitive
group of sophisticated investment professionals.
Of course, the natural counter-argument to this application of the Ecient Markets
Hypothesis is that hedge-fund managers cannot fully exploit such serial correlation because
of transactions costs and liquidity constraints. But once again, this leads to the main thesis
of this paper, that serial correlation is a proxy for illiquidity and smoothed returns.
There are, however, three additional explanations for the presence of serial correlation.
One of the central tenets of modern nancial economics is the necessity of some trade-o
between risk and expected return, hence serial correlation may not be exploitable in the
sense that an attempt to take advantage of predictabilities in fund returns might be oset
by corresponding changes in risk, leaving the fund manager indierent at the margin between
his current investment policy and other alternatives. Specically, LeRoy (1973), Rubinstein
(1976), and Lucas (1978) have demonstrated conclusively that serial correlation in asset re-
turns need not be the result of market ineciencies, but may be the result of time-varying
expected returns, which is perfectly consistent with the Ecient Markets Hypothesis.4 If
4Grossman (1976) and Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) go even further. They argue that perfectly informa-
tionally ecient markets are an impossibility, for if markets are perfectly ecient, the return to gathering
information is nil, in which case there would be little reason to trade and markets would eventually col-
lapse. Alternatively, the degree of market ineciency determines the eort investors are willing to expend
to gather and trade on information, hence a non-degenerate market equilibrium will arise only when there
are sucient prot opportunities, i.e., ineciencies, to compensate investors for the costs of trading and
information-gathering. The prots earned by these attentive investors may be viewed as economic rents that
accrue to those willing to engage in such activities. Who are the providers of these rents? Black (1986) gives
us a provocative answer: noise traders, individuals who trade on what they think is information but is in
fact merely noise.
6an investment strategy's required expected return varies through time|because of changes
in its risk exposures, for example|then serial correlation may be induced in realized re-
turns without implying any violation of market eciency (see Figure 1). We examine this
possibility more formally in Section 3.1.
E[Rt]
t
Figure 1: Time-varying expected returns can induce serial correlation in asset returns.
Another possible source of serial correlation in hedge-fund returns is time-varying lever-
age. If managers change the degree to which they leverage their investment strategies, and
if these changes occur in response to lagged market conditions, then this is tantamount to
the case of time-varying expected returns. We consider this case in Section 3.2.
Finally, we investigate one more potential explanation for serial correlation: the compen-
sation structure of the typical hedge fund. Because most hedge funds charge an incentive
fee coupled with a \high water mark" that must be surpassed before incentive fees are paid,
this path dependence in the computation for net-of-fee returns may induce serial correlation.
We develop a formal model of this phenomenon in Section 3.3.
The analysis of Sections 3.1{3.3 show that time-varying expected returns, time-varying
leverage, and incentive fees with high water marks can all generate serial correlation in
hedge-fund returns, but none of these eects can plausibly generate serial correlation to the
degree observed in the data, e.g., 30% to 50% for monthly returns. Therefore, illiquidity and
smoothed returns are more likely sources of serial correlation in hedge-fund returns.
73.1 Time-Varying Expected Returns
Let Rt denote a hedge fund's return in month t, and suppose that its dynamics are given by
the following time-series process:
Rt = 1 It + 0 (1   It) + t (1)
where t is assumed to be independently and identically distributed (IID) with mean 0 and
variance 2




It=1 p 1   p
It=0 1   q q
!
(2)
and 0 and 1 are the equilibrium expected returns of fund i in states 0 and 1, respectively.
This is a particularly simple model of time-varying expected returns in which we abstract
from the underlying structure of the economy that gives rise to (1), but focus instead on



















assuming that jp + q 1j < 1, hence the steady-state probabilities and moments for the






















5For examples of dynamic general equilibrium models that yield a Markov-switching process for asset
prices, and econometric methods to estimate such processes, see Cecchetti and Mark (1990), Goodwin
(1993), Hamilton (1989, 1990, 1996), Kandel and Stambaugh (1991), and Turner, Startz, and Nelson (1989).





















By calibrating the parameters 1, 0, p, q, and 2
 to empirically plausible values, we can
compute the serial correlation induced by time-varying expected returns using (9).
Observe from (9) that the serial correlation of returns depends on the squared dierence
of expected returns, (1 0)2, not on the particular values in either regime. Moreover, the
absolute magnitudes of the autocorrelation coecients k are monotonically increasing in
(1 0)2|the larger the dierence in expected returns between the two states, the more
serial correlation is induced. Therefore, we begin our calibration exercise by considering an
extreme case where j1 0j is 5% per month, or 60% per year, which yields rather dramatic
shifts in regimes. To complete the calibration exercise, we x the unconditional variance
of returns at a particular value, say (20%)2=12 (which is comparable with the volatility of
the S&P 500 over the past 30 years), vary p and q, and solve for the values of 2
 that are
consistent with the values of p, q, (1 0)2, and the unconditional variance of returns.
The top panel of Table 1 reports the rst-order autocorrelation coecients for various
values of p and q under these assumptions, and we see that even in this most extreme
case, the largest absolute magnitude of serial correlation is only 15%. The second panel
of Table 1 shows that when the unconditional variance of returns is increased from 20% to
50% per year, the correlations decline in magnitude with the largest absolute correlation
of 2.4%. And the bottom panel illustrates the kind of extreme parameter values needed to
obtain autocorrelations that are empirically relevant for hedge-fund returns|a dierence in
expected returns of 20% per month or 240% per year, and probabilities p and q that either
both 80% or higher, or both 20% or lower. Given the implausibility of these parameter
values, we conclude that time-varying expected returns|at least of this form|may not be
the most likely explanation for serial correlation in hedge-fund returns.
91 q (%)
(%) 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90
j1 0j = 5% , Var[Rt] = (20%)2=12
10  15:0  13:1  11:1  9:0  6:9  4:8  2:8  1:1 0:0
20  13:1  11:3  9:3  7:3  5:3  3:3  1:5 0:0 0:7
30  11:1  9:3  7:5  5:6  3:6  1:7 0:0 1:3 1:6
40  9:0  7:3  5:6  3:8  1:9 0:0 1:7 2:8 2:8
p (%) 50  6:9  5:3  3:6  1:9 0:0 1:9 3:5 4:6 4:2
60  4:8  3:3  1:7 0:0 1:9 3:8 5:5 6:7 6:0
70  2:8  1:5 0:0 1:7 3:5 5:5 7:5 9:0 8:4
80  1:1 0:0 1:3 2:8 4:6 6:7 9:0 11:3 11:7
90 0:0 0:7 1:6 2:8 4:2 6:0 8:4 11:7 15:0
j1 0j = 5% , Var[Rt] = (50%)2=12
10  2:4  2:1  1:8  1:4  1:1  0:8  0:5  0:2 0:0
20  2:1  1:8  1:5  1:2  0:9  0:5  0:2 0:0 0:1
30  1:8  1:5  1:2  0:9  0:6  0:3 0:0 0:2 0:3
40  1:4  1:2  0:9  0:6  0:3 0:0 0:3 0:5 0:4
p (%) 50  1:1  0:9  0:6  0:3 0:0 0:3 0:6 0:7 0:7
60  0:8  0:5  0:3 0:0 0:3 0:6 0:9 1:1 1:0
70  0:5  0:2 0:0 0:3 0:6 0:9 1:2 1:4 1:4
80  0:2 0:0 0:2 0:5 0:7 1:1 1:4 1:8 1:9
90 0:0 0:1 0:3 0:4 0:7 1:0 1:4 1:9 2:4
j1 0j = 20% , Var[Rt] = (50%)2=12
10  38:4  33:5  28:4  23:0  17:6  12:3  7:2  2:9 0:0
20  33:5  28:8  23:9  18:8  13:6  8:5  3:8 0:0 1:9
30  28:4  23:9  19:2  14:3  9:3  4:4 0:0 3:3 4:2
40  23:0  18:8  14:3  9:6  4:8 0:0 4:3 7:2 7:1
p (%) 50  17:6  13:6  9:3  4:8 0:0 4:7 9:0 11:8 10:7
60  12:3  8:5  4:4 0:0 4:7 9:6 14:1 17:1 15:4
70  7:2  3:8 0:0 4:3 9:0 14:1 19:2 23:0 21:6
80  2:9 0:0 3:3 7:2 11:8 17:1 23:0 28:8 29:9
90 0:0 1:9 4:2 7:1 10:7 15:4 21:6 29:9 38:4
Table 1: First-order autocorrelation coecients of returns from a two-state Markov model of
time-varying expected returns, Rt = 1 It +0(1 It)+t, where p  Prob(It+1 = 1jIt = 1),
q  Prob(It+1 = 0jIt = 0), 1 and 0 are the monthly expected returns in states 1 and 0,
respectively, and t  N(0;2
) and 2
 is calibrated to x the unconditional variance Var[Rt]
of returns at a prespecied level.
103.2 Time-Varying Leverage
Another possible source of serial correlation in hedge-fund returns is time-varying leverage.
Since leverage directly aects the expected return of any investment strategy, this can be
considered a special case of time-varying expected returns which we examined in Section 3.1.
Specically, if Lt denotes a hedge fund's leverage ratio, then the actual return Ro
t of the fund
at date t is given by:
R
o
t = Lt Rt (10)
where Rt is the fund's unlevered return.6 For example if a fund's unlevered strategy yields a
2% return in a given month, but 50% of the funds are borrowed from various counterparties
at xed borrowing rates, the return to the fund's investors is approximately 4%,7 hence the
leverage ratio is 2.
The specic mechanisms by which a hedge fund changes its leverage can be quite com-
plex and depend on a number of factors including market volatility, credit risk, and various
constraints imposed by investors, regulatory bodies, banks, brokers, and other counterpar-
ties. But the basic motivation for typical leverage dynamics is the well-known trade-o
between risk and expected return: by increasing its leverage ratio, a hedge fund boosts its
expected returns proportionally, but also increases its return volatility and, eventually, its
credit risk or risk of default. Therefore, counterparties providing credit facilities for hedge
funds will impose some ceiling on the degree of leverage they are willing to provide. More
importantly, as market prices move against a hedge fund's portfolio, thereby reducing the
value of the fund's collateral and increasing its leverage ratio, or as markets become more
volatile and the fund's risk exposure increases signicantly, creditors (and, in some cases,
securities regulations) will require the fund to either post additional collateral or liquidate
a portion of its portfolio to bring the leverage ratio back down to an acceptable level. As a
result, the leverage ratio of a typical hedge fund varies through time in a specic manner,
usually as a function of market prices and market volatility. Therefore we propose a simple
data-dependent mechanism through which a hedge fund determines its ideal leverage ratio.
Denote by Rt the return of a fund in the absence of any leverage, and to focus squarely
6For simplicity, and with little loss in generality, we have ignored the borrowing costs associated with
leverage in our specication (10). Although including such costs will obviously reduce the net return, the
serial correlation properties will be largely unaected because the time variation in borrowing rates is not
signicant relative to Rt and Lt.
7Less the borrowing rate, of course, which we assume is 0 for simplicity.
11on the ability of leverage to generate serial correlation, let Rt be IID through time, hence:
Rt =  + t ; t IID N(0;
2
) (11)
where we have assumed that t is normally distributed only for expositional convenience.8












Now suppose that the leverage process Lt is independently distributed through time and also
independent of t+k for all k. Then (12) implies that k=0 for all k6=0, hence time-varying
leverage of this sort will not induce any serial correlation in returns Ro
t.
However, as discussed above, leverage is typically a function of market conditions, which
can induce serial dependence in Lt and dependence between Lt+k and t for k  0, yielding
serially correlated observed returns Ro
t.
To see how, we propose a simple but realistic mechanism by which a hedge fund might
determine its leverage. Suppose that, as part of its enterprise-wide risk management protocol,
a fund has adopted a policy of limiting the 95% Value-at-Risk of its portfolio to no worse
than |for example, if  =  10%, this policy requires managing the portfolio so that the
probability of a loss greater than or equal to 10% is at most 5%. If we assume that the
only control variable available to the manager is the leverage ratio Lt and that unleveraged
8Other distributions can easily be used instead of the normal in the Monte Carlo simulation experiment
described below.
12returns Rt are given by (11), this implies the following constraint on leverage:
Prob(R
o
t  )  5% ;   0






















where, following common industry practice, we have set =0 in (13) to arrive at (14).9 Now
in implementing the constraint (15), the manager must estimate the portfolio volatility ,
which is typically estimated using some rolling window of historical data, hence the manager's
estimate is likely to be time-varying but persistent to some degree. This persistence, and
the dependence of the volatility estimate on past returns, will both induce serial correlation
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where we have assumed that the manager sets his leverage ratio Lt to the maximum allowable
level subject to the VaR constraint (15).
To derive the impact of this heuristic risk management policy on the serial correlation
of observed returns, we perform a Monte Carlo simulation experiment where we simulate
a time series of 100,000 returns fRtg and implement the leverage policy (17) to obtain a
time series of observed returns fRo
tg, from which we compute its autocorrelation coecients
fkg. Given the large sample size, our estimate should yield an excellent approximation to
9Setting the expected return of a portfolio equal to 0 for purposes of risk management is often motivated
by a desire to be conservative. Most portfolios will tend to have positive expected return, hence setting 
equal to 0 will generally yield larger values for VaR. However, for actively managed portfolios that contain
both long and short positions, Lo (2002) shows that the practice of setting expected returns equal to 0 need
not be conservative, but in some cases, can yield severely downward-biased estimates of VaR.
13the population values of the autocorrelation coecients. This procedure is performed for






and the results are summarized in Table 2. Note that the autocorrelation of observed returns
(12) is homogeneous of degree 0 in , hence we need only simulate our return process for
one value of  without loss of generality as far as k is concerned. Of course, the mean and
standard of observed returns and leverage will be aected by our choice of , but because
these variables are homogeneous of degree 1, we can obtain results for any arbitrary  simply
by rescaling our results for = 25%.
For a VaR constraint of  25% and an annual standard deviation of unlevered returns
of 10%, the mean leverage ratio ranges from 9.52 when n = 3 to 4.51 when n = 60. For
small n, there is considerably more sampling variation in the estimated standard deviation
of returns, hence the leverage ratio|which is proportional to the reciprocal of ^ t|takes on
more extreme values as well and has a higher expectation in this case.
As n increases, the volatility estimator becomes more stable over time since each month's
estimator has more data in common with the previous month's estimator, leading to more
persistence in Lt as expected. For example, when n=3, the average rst-order autocorrela-
tion coecient of Lt is 43.2%, but increases to 98.2% when n=60. However, even with such
extreme levels of persistence in Lt, the autocorrelation induced in observed returns Ro
t is still
only  0:2%. In fact, the largest absolute return-autocorrelation reported in Table 2 is only
0:7%, despite the fact that leverage ratios are sometimes nearly perfectly autocorrelated from
month to month. This suggests that time-varying leverage, at least of the form described
by the VaR constraint (15), cannot fully account for the magnitudes of serial correlation in
historical hedge-fund returns.
3.3 Incentive Fees with High-Water Marks
Yet another source of serial correlation in hedge-fund returns is an aspect of the fee structure
that is commonly used in the hedge-fund industry: an incentive fee|typically 20% of excess
returns above a benchmark|which is subject to a \high-water mark", meaning that incentive
14n
Return Ro




12SD Mean SD 1 2 3 1 2 3
(%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%)
12 = 5% ,
p
12 = 10% ,  =  25%
3 50.53 191.76 9.52 15.14 0:7 0:3 0:4 17:5 2:9 0:0
6 29.71 62.61 5.73 2.45 0:1 0:4 0:3 70:6 48:5 32:1
12 24.34 51.07 4.96 1.19 0:1 0:4  0:3 88:9 78:6 68:8
24 24.29 47.27 4.66 0.71 0:3 0:1  0:2 95:0 90:0 85:1
36 21.46 46.20 4.57 0.57  0:2 0:0 0:1 96:9 93:9 90:9
48 22.67 45.61 4.54 0.46 0:3  0:5 0:3 97:6 95:3 92:9
60 22.22 45.38 4.51 0.43  0:2 0:0 0:2 98:2 96:5 94:7
12 = 5% ,
p
12 = 20% ,  =  25%
3 26.13 183.78 4.80 8.02 0:0  0:1 0:0 13:4 1:9  0:6
6 14.26 62.55 2.87 1.19 0:2 0:1 0:4 70:7 48:6 32:0
12 12.95 50.99 2.48 0.59 0:2  0:1 0:1 89:1 79:0 69:4
24 11.58 47.22 2.33 0.36 0:2 0:0 0:1 95:2 90:4 85:8
36 11.23 46.14 2.29 0.28  0:1 0:3  0:3 97:0 94:0 90:9
48 11.00 45.63 2.27 0.24 0:2  0:5  0:1 97:8 95:5 93:3
60 12.18 45.37 2.26 0.21 0:1  0:1 0:4 98:3 96:5 94:8
12 = 5% ,
p
12 = 50% ,  =  25%
3 9.68 186.59 1.93 3.42  1:1 0:0  0:5 14:7 1:8  0:1
6 6.25 62.43 1.16 0.48  0:2 0:3  0:2 70:9 49:4 32:9
12 5.90 50.94 0.99 0.23  0:1 0:1 0:0 89:0 78:6 69:0
24 5.30 47.29 0.93 0.15 0:2 0:3 0:4 95:2 90:5 85:7
36 5.59 46.14 0.92 0.12  0:1 0:3  0:2 97:0 94:1 91:1
48 4.07 45.64 0.91 0.10  0:4  0:6 0:1 97:8 95:7 93:5
60 5.11 45.34 0.90 0.08 0:4 0:3  0:3 98:2 96:5 94:7
Table 2: Monte Carlo simulation results for time-varying leverage model with a VaR con-
straint. Each row corresponds to a separate and independent simulation of 100,000 observa-
tions of independently and identically distributed N(;2) returns Rt which are multiplied
by a time-varying leverage factor Lt to generated observed returns Ro
t LtRt.
15fees are paid only if the cumulative returns of the fund are \above water", i.e., if they exceed
the cumulative return of the benchmark since inception.10 This type of nonlinearity can
induce serial correlation in net-of-fee returns because of the path dependence inherent in
the denition of the high-water mark|when the fund is \below water" the incentive fee is
not charged, but over time, as the fund's cumulative performance rises \above water", the
incentive fee is reinstated and the net-of-fee returns is reduced accordingly.
Specically, denote by Ft the incentive fee paid to the manager in period t and for
simplicity, set the benchmark to 0. Then:
Ft  Max[ 0 ; 
(Xt 1 + Rt) ] ; 
 > 0 (18a)
Xt  Min[ 0 ; Xt 1 + Rt ] (18b)
where Xt is a state variable that is non-zero only when the manager is \under water", in
which case it measures the cumulative losses that must be recovered before an incentive fee
is paid. The net-of-fee returns Ro
t are then given by:
R
o
t = Rt   Ft = (1 
)Rt + 
(Xt Xt 1) (19)
which is clearly serially correlated due to the presence of the lagged state variable Xt 1.11
Because the high-water mark variable Xt is a nonlinear recursive function of Xt 1 and Rt,
its statistical properties are quite complex and dicult to derive in closed form. Therefore,
we perform a Monte Carlo simulation experiment in which we simulate a time series of
returns fRtg of length T =100;000 where Rt is given by (11), compute the net-of-fee returns
fRo
tg, and estimate the rst-order autocorrelation coecient 1. We follow this procedure
10For more detailed analyses of high water marks and other incentive-fee arrangements in the context of
delegated portfolio management, see Bhattacharya and P
eiderer (1985), Brown, Goetzmann, and Liang
(2002), Carpenter (2000), Carpenter, Dybvig, and Farnsworth (2001), Elton and Gruber (2002), and Goet-
zmann, Ingersoll, and Ross (1997).
11This is a simplied model of how a typical hedge fund's incentive fee is structured. In particular, (18)
ignores the fact that incentive fees are usually paid on an annual or quarterly basis whereas high-water marks
are tracked on a monthly basis. Using the more realistic fee cycle did not have signicant impact on our
simulation results, hence we use (18) for expositional simplicity. Also, some funds do pay their employees and
partners monthly incentive compensation, in which case (18) is the exact specication of their fee structure.





 = 20% :
Table 3 summarizes the results of the simulations which show that although incentive fees
with high-water marks do induce some serial correlation in net-of-fee returns, they are gen-
erally quite small in absolute value. For example, the largest absolute value of all the entries
in Table 3 is only 4:4%. Moreover, all of the averages are negative, a result of the fact that
all of the serial correlation in Ro
t is due to the rst dierence of Xt in (19). This implies
that incentive fees with high-water marks are even less likely to be able to explain the large
positive serial correlation coecients in historical hedge-fund returns.
1 12 (%)
(%) 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50
10  1:4  2:5  3:2  3:4  3:4  3:2  2:9  2:4  2:0  1:5
20  1:6  2:3  2:9  3:4  3:8  4:1  4:3  4:4  4:4  4:3
 
p
12 (%) 30  0:6  1:1  1:6  2:1  2:4  2:8  3:0  3:3  3:5  3:6
40  0:2  0:7  1:1  1:4  1:8  2:1  2:3  2:6  2:8  3:0
50 0:0  0:3  0:6  0:9  1:2  1:5  1:7  1:9  2:1  2:3
Table 3: First-order autocorrelation coecients for Monte Carlo simulation of net-of-fee re-
turns under an incentive fee with a high-water mark. Each entry corresponds to a separate
and independent simulation of 100,000 observations of independently and identically dis-
tributed N(;2) returns Rt, from which a 20% incentive fee Ft  Max[0;0:2(Xt 1+Rt)] is
subtracted each period to yield net-of-fee returns Ro
t  Rt Ft, where Xt  Min[0;Xt 1+Rt]
is a state variable that is non-zero only when the fund is \under water", in which case it
measures the cumulative losses that must be recovered before an incentive fee is paid.
4 An Econometric Model of Smoothed Returns
Having shown in Section 3 that other possible sources of serial correlation in hedge-fund
returns are hard-pressed to yield empirically plausible levels of autocorrelation, we now turn
to the main focus of this study: illiquidity and smoothed returns. Although illiquidity and
smoothed returns are two distinct phenomena, it is important to consider them in tandem
because one facilitates the other|for actively traded securities, both theory and empirical
17evidence suggest that in the absence of transactions costs and other market frictions, returns
are unlikely to be very smooth.
As we argued in Section 1, nonsynchronous trading is a plausible source of serial corre-
lation in hedge-fund returns. In contrast to the studies by Lo and MacKinlay (1988, 1990)
and Kadlec and Patterson (1999) in which they conclude that it is dicult to generate serial
correlations in weekly US equity portfolio returns much greater than 10% to 15% through
nonsynchronous trading eects alone, we argue that in the context of hedge funds, signi-
cantly higher levels of serial correlation can be explained by the combination of illiquidity
and smoothed returns, of which nonsynchronous trading is a special case. To see why, note
that the empirical analysis in the nonsynchronous-trading literature is devoted exclusively
to exchange-traded equity returns, not hedge-fund returns, hence their conclusions may not
be relevant in our context. For example, Lo and MacKinlay (1990) argue that securities
would have to go without trading for several days on average to induce serial correlations of
30%, and they dismiss such nontrading intervals as unrealistic for most exchange-traded US
equity issues. However, such nontrading intervals are quite a bit more realistic for the types
of securities held by many hedge funds, e.g., emerging-market debt, real estate, restricted
securities, control positions in publicly traded companies, asset-backed securities, and other
exotic OTC derivatives. Therefore, nonsynchronous trading of this magnitude is likely to be
an explanation for the serial correlation observed in hedge-fund returns.
But even when prices are synchronously measured|as they are for many funds that mark
their portfolios to market at the end of the month to strike a net-asset-value at which investors
can buy into or cash out of the fund|there are several other channels by which illiquidity
exposure can induce serial correlation in the reported returns of hedge funds. Apart from
the nonsynchronous-trading eect, naive methods for determining the fair market value or
\marks" for illiquid securities can yield serially correlated returns. For example, one approach
to valuing illiquid securities is to extrapolate linearly from the most recent transaction price
(which, in the case of emerging-market debt, might be several months ago), which yields
a price path that is a straight line, or at best a series of straight lines. Returns computed
from such marks will be smoother, exhibiting lower volatility and higher serial correlation
than true economic returns, i.e., returns computed from mark-to-market prices where the
market is suciently active to allow all available information to be impounded in the price of
the security. Of course, for securities that are more easily traded and with deeper markets,
mark-to-market prices are more readily available, extrapolated marks are not necessary, and
serial correlation is therefore less of an issue. But for securities that are thinly traded, or not
traded at all for extended periods of time, marking them to market is often an expensive and
time-consuming procedure that cannot easily be performed frequently. Therefore, we argue
18in this paper that serial correlation may serve as a proxy for a fund's liquidity exposure.
Even if a hedge-fund manager does not make use of any form of linear extrapolation to
mark the securities in his portfolio, he may still be subject to smoothed returns if he obtains
marks from broker-dealers that engage in such extrapolation. For example, consider the
case of a conscientious hedge-fund manager attempting to obtain the most accurate mark
for his portfolio at month end by getting bid/oer quotes from three independent broker-
dealers for every security in his portfolio, and then marking each security at the average of
the three quote midpoints. By averaging the quote midpoints, the manager is inadvertently
downward-biasing price volatility, and if any of the broker-dealers employ linear extrapolation
in formulating their quotes (and many do, through sheer necessity because they have little
else to go on for the most illiquid securities), or if they fail to update their quotes because
of light volume, serial correlation will also be induced in reported returns.
Finally, a more prosaic channel by which serial correlation may arise in the reported re-
turns of hedge funds is through \performance smoothing", the unsavory practice of reporting
only part of the gains in months when a fund has positive returns so as to partially oset
potential future losses and thereby reduce volatility and improve risk-adjusted performance
measures such as the Sharpe ratio. For funds containing liquid securities that can be easily
marked to market, performance smoothing is more dicult and, as a result, less of a con-
cern. Indeed, it is only for portfolios of illiquid securities that managers and brokers have
any discretion in marking their positions. Such practices are generally prohibited by various
securities laws and accounting principles, and great care must be exercised in interpreting
smoothed returns as deliberate attempts to manipulate performance statistics. After all, as
we have discussed above, there are many other sources of serial correlation in the presence
of illiquidity, none of which is motivated by deceit. Nevertheless, managers do have certain
degrees of freedom in valuing illiquid securities|for example, discretionary accruals for un-
registered private placements and venture capital investments|and Chandar and Bricker
(2002) conclude that managers of certain closed-end mutual funds do use accounting dis-
cretion to manage fund returns around a passive benchmark. Therefore, the possibility of
deliberate performance smoothing in the less regulated hedge-fund industry must be kept in
mind in interpreting our empirical analysis of smoothed returns.
To quantify the impact of all of these possible sources of serial correlation, denote by Rt
the true economic return of a hedge fund in period t, and let Rt satisfy the following linear
19single-factor model:
Rt =  + t + t ; E[t] = E[t] = 0 ; t ; t  IID (20a)
Var[Rt]  
2 : (20b)
True returns represent the 
ow of information that would determine the equilibrium value
of the fund's securities in a frictionless market. However, true economic returns are not
observed. Instead, Ro
t denotes the reported or observed return in period t, and let
R
o
t = 0 Rt + 1 Rt 1 +  + k Rt k (21)
j 2 [0;1] ; j = 0;:::;k (22)
1 = 0 + 1 +  + k (23)
which is a weighted average of the fund's true returns over the most recent k+1 periods,
including the current period.
This averaging process captures the essence of smoothed returns in several respects. From
the perspective of illiquidity-driven smoothing, (21) is consistent with several models in the
nonsynchronous trading literature. For example, Cohen, Maier et al. (1986, Chapter 6.1)
propose a similar weighted-average model for observed returns.12 Alternatively, (21) can be
viewed as the outcome of marking portfolios to simple linear extrapolations of acquisition
prices when market prices are unavailable, or \mark-to-model" returns where the pricing
model is slowly varying through time. And of course, (21) also captures the intentional
smoothing of performance.
The constraint (23) that the weights sum to 1 implies that the information driving the
fund's performance in period t will eventually be fully re
ected in observed returns, but this







where rj;t l is the true but unobserved return for security j in period t l, the coecients f
j;t l;lg are
assumed to sum to 1, and j;t l are random variables meant to capture \bid/ask bounce". The authors




j;t;N comprise a delay distribution that shows how the true return generated in period
t impacts on the returns actually observed during t and the next N periods". In other words, the essential
feature of nonsynchronous trading is the fact that information generated at date t may not be fully impounded
into prices until several periods later.
20process could take up to k+1 periods from the time the information is generated.13 This is a
sensible restriction in the current context of hedge funds for several reasons. Even the most
illiquid securities will trade eventually, and when that occurs, all of the cumulative informa-
tion aecting that security will be fully impounded into its transaction price. Therefore the
parameter k should be selected to match the kind of illiquidity of the fund|a fund comprised
mostly of exchange-traded US equities fund would require a much lower value of k than a
private equity fund. Alternatively, in the case of intentional smoothing of performance, the
necessity of periodic external audits of fund performance imposes a nite limit on the extent
to which deliberate smoothing can persist.14
4.1 Implications For Performance Statistics
Given the smoothing mechanism outlined above, we have the following implications for the
statistical properties of observed returns:
Proposition 1 Under (21){(23), the statistical properties of observed returns are charac-
13In Lo and MacKinlay's (1990) model of nonsynchronous trading, they propose a stochastic non-trading
horizon so that observed returns are an innite-order moving average of past true returns, where the coe-
cients are stochastic. In that framework, the waiting time for information to become fully impounded into
future returns may be arbitrarily long (but with increasingly remote probability).
14In fact, if a fund allows investors to invest and withdraw capital only at pre-specied intervals, imposing
lock-ups in between, and external audits are conducted at these same pre-specied intervals, then it may
be argued that performance smoothing is irrelevant. For example, no investor should be disadvantaged by
investing in a fund that oers annual liquidity and engages in annual external audits with which the fund's
net-asset-value is determined by a disintereted third party for purposes of redemptions and new investments.
There are, however, two additional concerns that are not addressed by this practice|track records are still
aected by smoothed returns, and estimates of a fund's liquidity exposure are also aected, both of which
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if 0  m  k
0 if m > k
(29)
where:













0 +  + 2
k (32)
c;m  m (33)
Proposition 1 shows that smoothed returns of the form (21){(23) do not aect the expected
value of Ro
t but reduce its variance, hence boosting the Sharpe ratio of observed returns
by a factor of cs. From (27), we see that smoothing also aects o
0, the contemporaneous
market beta of observed returns, biasing it towards 0 or \market neutrality", and induces
correlation between current observed returns and lagged market returns up to lag k. This
provides a formal interpretation of the empirical analysis of Asness, Krail, and Liew (2001)
in which many hedge funds were found to have signicant lagged market exposure despite
relatively low contemporaneous market betas.
22Smoothed returns also exhibit positive serial correlation up to order k according to (29),
and the magnitude of the eect is determined by the pattern of weights fjg. If, for example,
the weights are disproportionately centered on a small number of lags, relatively little serial
correlation will be induced. However, if the weights are evenly distributed among many lags,
this will result in higher serial correlation. A useful summary statistic for measuring the






j 2 [0;1] (34)
which is simply the denominator of (29). This measure is well known in the industrial
organization literature as the Herndahl index, a measure of the concentration of an industry
where j represents the market share of rm j. Because j 2 [0;1],  is also conned to the
unit interval, and is minimized when all the j's are identical, which implies a value of 1=(k+1)
for , and is maximized when one coecient is 1 and the rest are 0, in which case =1. In
the context of smoothed returns, a lower value of  implies more smoothing, and the upper
bound of 1 implies no smoothing, hence we shall refer to  as a \smoothing index".
In the special case of equal weights, j = 1=(k+1) for j =0;:::;k, the serial correlation





t m] = 1  
m
k + 1
; 1  m  k (35)
which declines linearly in the lag m. This can yield substantial correlations even when k
is small|for example, if k = 2 so that smoothing takes place only over a current quarter
(i.e. this month and the previous two months), the rst-order autocorrelation of monthly
observed returns is 66.7%.
To develop a sense for just how much observed returns can dier from true returns
under the smoothed-return mechanism (21){(23), denote by (T) the dierence between
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Proposition 2 Under (21){(23) and for T > k,























Proposition 2 shows that the cumulative dierence between observed and true returns has 0
expected value, and its variance is bounded above by 2k2.
4.2 Examples of Smoothing Proles
To develop further intuition for the impact of smoothed returns on observed returns, we
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1   k+1 ;  2 (0;1) (Geometric) : (43)
The straightline prole weights each return equally. In contrast, the sum-of-years and geo-
metric proles weight the current return the most heavily, and then has monotonically de-
clining weights, with the sum-of-years weights declining linearly and the geometric weights
declining more rapidly (see Figure 2).
More detailed information about the three smoothing proles is contained in Table 4. The
rst panel reports the smoothing coecients fjg, constants c;0, c, cs, , and the rst three
autocorrelations of observed returns for the straightline prole for k = 0;1;:::;5. Consider
the case where k = 2. Despite the relatively short smoothing period of three months, the
eects are dramatic: smoothing reduces the market beta by 67%, increases the Sharpe ratio
15Students of accounting will recognize these proles as commonly used methods for computing deprecia-
tion. The motivation for these depreciation schedules is not entirely without relevance in the smoothed-return
context.















Figure 2: Straightline, sum-of-years, and geometric smoothing proles for k=10.
25by 73%, and induces rst- and second-order serial correlation of 67% and 33%, respectively,
in observed returns. Moreover, the variance of the cumulative discrepancy between observed
and true returns, 22, is only slightly larger than the variance of monthly true returns 2,
suggesting that it may be dicult to detect this type of smoothed returns even over time.
As k increases, the eects become more pronounced|for k=5, the market beta is reduced
by 83%, the Sharpe ratio is increased by 145%, and rst three autocorrelation coecients
are 83%, 67%, and 50%, respectively. However, in this extreme case, the variance of the
discrepancy between true and observed returns is approximately three times the monthly
variance of true returns, in which case it may be easier to identify smoothing from realized
returns.
The sum-of-years prole is similar to, although somewhat less extreme than, the straight-
line prole for the same values of k because more weight is being placed on the current return.
For example, even in the extreme case of k=5, the sum-of-years prole reduces the market
beta by 71%, increases the Sharpe ratio by 120%, induces autocorrelations of 77%, 55%, and
35%, respectively, in the rst three lags, and has a discrepancy variance that is approximately
1.6 times the monthly variance of true returns.
The last two panels of Table 4 contain results for the geometric smoothing prole for two
values of , 0.25 and 0.50. In the rst case where =0:25, the geometric prole places more
weight on the current return than the other two smoothing proles for all values of k, hence
the eects tend to be less dramatic. Even in the extreme case of k=5, 75% of current true
returns are incorporated into observed returns, the market beta is reduced by only 25%, the
Sharpe ratio is increased by only 29%, the rst three autocorrelations are 25%, 6%, and 1%
respectively, and the discrepancy variance is approximately 13% of the monthly variance of
true returns. As  increases, less weight is placed on the current observation and the eects
on performance statistics become more signicant. When  = 0:50 and k = 5, geometric
smoothing reduces the market beta by 49%, increases the Sharpe ratio by 71%, induces
autocorrelations of 50%, 25%, and 12%, respectively, for the rst three lags, and yields a
discrepancy variance that is approximately 63% of the monthly variance of true returns.






k(3k2 + 6k + 1)
15(k + 1)(k + 2)
(45)
 =
2( 1 + k(2 + 2 + k( 1   2 + k(2   1))))
(2   1)(k+1   1)2 (46)
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(%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%)
Straightline Smoothing
0 100:0 | | | | | 1:00 1:00 1:00 0:0 0:0 0:0 0:0 0:0 |
1 50:0 50:0 | | | | 0:50 0:71 1:41 50:0 0:0 0:0 0:0 0:0 25:0
2 33:3 33:3 33:3 | | | 0:33 0:58 1:73 66:7 33:3 0:0 0:0 0:0 55:6
3 25:0 25:0 25:0 25:0 | | 0:25 0:50 2:00 75:0 50:0 25:0 0:0 0:0 87:5
4 20:0 20:0 20:0 20:0 20:0 | 0:20 0:45 2:24 80:0 60:0 40:0 20:0 0:0 120:0
5 16:7 16:7 16:7 16:7 16:7 16:7 0:17 0:41 2:45 83:3 66:7 50:0 33:3 16:7 152:8
Sum-of-Years Smoothing
0 100:0 | | | | | 1:00 1:00 1:00 0:0 0:0 0:0 0:0 0:0 |
1 66:7 33:3 | | | | 0:67 0:75 1:34 40:0 0:0 0:0 0:0 0:0 11:1
2 50:0 33:3 16:7 | | | 0:50 0:62 1:60 57:1 21:4 0:0 0:0 0:0 27:8
3 40:0 30:0 20:0 10:0 | | 0:40 0:55 1:83 66:7 36:7 13:3 0:0 0:0 46:0
4 33:3 26:7 20:0 13:3 6:7 | 0:33 0:49 2:02 72:7 47:3 25:5 9:1 0:0 64:9
5 28:6 23:8 19:0 14:3 9:5 4:8 0:29 0:45 2:20 76:9 54:9 35:2 18:7 6:6 84:1
Geometric Smoothing ( = 0:25)
0 100:0 | | | | | 1:00 1:00 1:00 0:0 0:0 0:0 0:0 0:0 |
1 80:0 20:0 | | | | 0:80 0:82 1:21 23:5 0:0 0:0 0:0 0:0 4:0
2 76:2 19:0 4:8 | | | 0:76 0:79 1:27 24:9 5:9 0:0 0:0 0:0 5:9
3 75:3 18:8 4:7 1:2 | | 0:75 0:78 1:29 25:0 6:2 1:5 0:0 0:0 6:5
4 75:1 18:8 4:7 1:2 0:3 | 0:75 0:78 1:29 25:0 6:2 1:6 0:4 0:0 6:6
5 75:0 18:8 4:7 1:2 0:3 0:1 0:75 0:77 1:29 25:0 6:2 1:6 0:4 0:1 6:7
Geometric Smoothing ( = 0:50)
0 100:0 | | | | | 1:00 1:00 1:00 0:0 0:0 0:0 0:0 0:0 |
1 66:7 33:3 | | | | 0:67 0:75 1:34 40:0 0:0 0:0 0:0 0:0 11:1
2 57:1 28:6 14:3 | | | 0:57 0:65 1:53 47:6 19:0 0:0 0:0 0:0 20:4
3 53:3 26:7 13:3 6:7 | | 0:53 0:61 1:63 49:4 23:5 9:4 0:0 0:0 26:2
4 51:6 25:8 12:9 6:5 3:2 | 0:52 0:60 1:68 49:9 24:6 11:7 4:7 0:0 29:6
5 50:8 25:4 12:7 6:3 3:2 1:6 0:51 0:59 1:71 50:0 24:9 12:3 5:9 2:3 31:4
Table 4: Implications of three dierent smoothing proles for observed betas, standard
deviations, Sharpe ratios, and serial correlation coecients for a fund with IID true returns.
Straightline smoothing is given by j = 1=(k+1); sum-of-years smoothing is given by j =
(k+1 j)=[(k+1)(k+2)=2]; geometric smooothing is given by j = j(1 )=(1 k+1). c,
c, and cs denote multipliers associated with the beta, standard deviation, and Sharpe ratio
of observed returns, respectively, o
j denotes the j-th autocorrelation coecient of observed
returns, and  is proportional to the variance of the discrepancy between true and observed
multi-period returns.
27with the straightline and sum-of-years proles implying variances for (T) that grow approx-
imately linearly in k, and the geometric prole implying a variance for (T) that asymptotes
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Figure 3: Straightline, sum-of-years, and geometric smoothing proles for k=10.
The results in Table 4 and Figure 3 show that a rich set of biases can be generated by
even simple smoothing proles, and even the most casual empirical observation suggests that
smoothed returns may be an important source of serial correlation in hedge-fund returns.
To address this issue directly, we propose methods for estimating the smoothing prole in
Section 5 and apply these methods to the data in Section 6.
5 Estimation of Smoothing Proles and Sharpe Ratios
Although the smoothing proles described in Section 4.2 can all be easily estimated from the
sample moments of fund returns, e.g., means, variances, and autocorrelations, we wish to
28be able to estimate more general forms of smoothing. Therefore, in this section we propose
two estimation procedures|maximum likelihood and linear regression|that place fewer
restrictions on a fund's smoothing prole than the three examples in Section 4.2. In Section
5.1 we review the steps for maximum likelihood estimation of an MA(k) process, slightly
modied to accommodate our context and constraints, and in Section 5.2 we consider a
simpler alternative based on linear regression under the assumption that true returns are
generated by the linear single-factor model (20). We propose several specication checks to
evaluate the robustness of our smoothing model in Section 5.3, and in Section 5.4 we show
how to adjust Sharpe ratios to take smoothed returns into account.
5.1 Maximum Likelihood Estimation
Given the specication of the smoothing process in (21){(23), we can estimate the smoothing
prole using maximum likelihood estimation in a fashion similar to the estimation of standard
moving-average time series models (see, for example, Brockwell and Davis, 1991, Chapter
8). We begin by dening the de-meaned observed returns process Xt:
Xt = R
o
t    (47)
and observing that (21){(23) implies the following properties for Xt:
Xt = 0t + 1t 1 +  + kt k (48)




where, for purposes of estimation, we have added the parametric assumption (50) that k is
normally distributed. From (48), it is apparent that Xt is a moving-average process of order
k, or \MA(k)". Then for a given set of observations X  [ X1  XT ]0, the likelihood






 1X) ;    E[XX
0] (51)
29where   [ 0  k ]0 and   is a function of the parameters  and . It can be shown
that for any constant ,
L(;=) = L(;) ; (52)
therefore, an additional identication condition is required. The most common identication
condition imposed in the time-series literature is the normalization 0  1. However, in our
context, we impose the condition (49) that the MA coecients sum to 1|an economic
restriction that smoothing takes place over only the most recent k+1 periods|and this is
sucient to identify the parameters  and . The likelihood function (51) may be then
evaluated and maximized via the \innovations algorithm" of Brockwell and Davis (1991,
Chapter 8.3),16 and the properties of the estimator are given by:
Proposition 3 Under the specication (48){(50), Xt is invertible on the set f : 0 +1 +
2 = 1; 1 < 1=2; 1 < 1   22 g, and the maximum likelihood estimator ^  satises the
following properties:
1 = ^ 0 + ^ 1 + ^ 2 (56)
16Specically, let ^ X = [ ^ X1  ^ XT ]0 where ^ X1 = 0 and ^ Xj = E[XjjX1;:::;Xj 1], j  2. Let rt =
E[(Xt+1   ^ Xt+1)2]=2










(Xt   ^ Xt)2=rt 1
#
(53)
where the one-step-ahead predictors ^ Xt and their normalized mean-squared errors rt 1, t = 1;:::;T are
calculated recursively according to the formulas given in Brockwell and Davis (1991, Proposition 5.2.2).
Taking the derivative of (53) with respect to 2
, see that the maximum likelihood estimator ^ 2
 is given by:
^ 2
 = S() = T  1
T X
t=1
(Xt   ^ Xt)2=rt 1 (54)
hence we can \concentrate" the likelihood function by substituting (54) into (53) to obtain:




which can be minimized in  subject to the constraint (49) using standard numerical optimization packages
(we use Matlab's Optimization Toolbox in our empirical analysis). Maximum likelihood estimates obtained
in this fashion need not yield an invertible MA(k) process, but it is well known that any non-invertible
process can always be transformed into an invertible one simply by adjusting the parameters 2
 and . To













a  N(0; V ) (57)
V 
"
 ( 1 + 1)( 1 + 21)( 1 + 1 + 22)  2( 1 + 21)( 1 + 1 + 22)
 2( 1 + 21)( 1 + 1 + 22) ( 1 + 1   2( 1 + 2)2)( 1 + 1 + 22)
#
(58)
By applying the above procedure to observed de-meaned returns, we may obtain estimates
of the smoothing prole ^  for each fund.17 Because of the scaling property (52) of the MA(k)
likelihood function, a simple procedure for obtaining estimates of our smoothing model with
the normalization (49) is to transform estimates ( ;  ) from standard MA(k) estimation
packages such as SAS or RATS by dividing each  i by 1+ 1++  k and multiplying   by
the same factor. The likelihood function remains unchanged but the transformed smoothing
coecients will now satisfy (49).
5.2 Linear Regression Analysis
Although we proposed a linear single-factor model (20) in Section 4 for true returns so as
to derive the implications of smoothed returns for the market beta of observed returns,
the maximum likelihood procedure outlined in Section 5.1 is designed to estimate the more
general specication of IID Gaussian returns, regardless of any factor structure. However,
if we are willing to impose (20), a simpler method for estimating the smoothing prole is
available. By substituting (20) into (21), we can re-express observed returns as:
R
o
t =  +  (0t + 1t 1 +  + kt k) + ut (59)
ut = 0t + 1t 1 +  + kt k : (60)
Suppose we estimate the following linear regression of observed returns on contemporaneous
and lagged market returns:
R
o
t =  + 
0t + 
1t 1 +  + 
kt k + ut (61)
17Recall from Proposition 1 that the smoothing process (21){(23) does not aect the expected return, i.e.,
the sample mean of observed returns is a consistent estimator of the true expected return. Therefore, we
may use Ro
t   ^  in place of Xt in the estimation process without altering any of the asymptotic properties
of the maximum likelihood estimator.
31as in Asness, Krail and Liew (2001). Using the normalization (23) from our smoothing
model, we can obtain estimators for  and fjg readily:
^  = ^ 
0 + ^ 
1 +  + ^ 
k ; ^ j = ^ 
j=^  : (62)















Because of serial correlation in ut, ordinary least squares estimates (62) will not be ecient
and the usual standard errors are incorrect, but the estimates are still consistent and may
be a useful rst approximation for identifying smoothing in hedge-fund returns.18
There is yet another variation of the linear single-factor model that may help to disentan-
gle the eects of illiquidity from return smoothing.19 Suppose that a fund's true economic
returns Rt satises:
Rt =  + t + t ; t  IID(0;
2
) (64)
but instead of assuming that the common factor t is IID as in (20), let t be serially
correlated. While this alternative may seem to be a minor variation of the smoothing model
(21){(23), the dierence in interpretation is signicant. A serially correlated t captures the
fact that a fund's returns may be autocorrelated because of an illiquid common factor, even
in the absence of any smoothing process such as (21){(23). Of course, this still begs the
question of what the ultimate source of serial correlation might be, but by combining (64)
with the smoothing process (21){(23), it may be possible to distinguish between \systematic"
versus \idiosyncratic" smoothing, the former attributable to the asset class and the latter
resulting from fund-specic characteristics.
To see why the combination of (64) and (21){(23) may have dierent implications for
observed returns, suppose for the moment that there is no smoothing, i.e., 0 = 1 and k = 0
18To obtain ecient estimates of the smoothing coecients, a procedure like the maximum likelihood
estimator of Section 5.1 must be used.
19We thank the referee for encouraging us to explore this alternative.
32for k > 0 in (21){(23). Then observed returns are simply given by:
R
o




t is now serially correlated solely through t. This specication implies that the















Moreover, (64) implies that in the regression equation (61), the coecients of the lagged
factor returns are zero and the error term is not serially correlated.
More generally, consider the combination of a serially correlated common factor (64)
and smoothed returns (21){(23). This more general econometric model of observed returns
implies that the appropriate specication of the regression equation is:
R
o
t =  + 
0t + 
1t 1 +  + 
kt k + ut (67)
ut = 0t + 1t 1 +  + kt k ; t  IID(0;
2
) (68)
1 = 0 + 1 +  + k : (69)
To the extent that serial correlation in Ro
t can be explained mainly by the common factor,
the lagged coecient estimates of (67) will be statistically insignicant, the residuals will be
serially uncorrelated, and the ratios of autocovariance coecients will be roughly constant
across funds with the same common factor. To the extent that the smoothing process (21){
(23) is responsible for serial correlation in Ro
t, the lagged coecient estimates of (67) will
be signicant, the residuals will be serially correlated, and the ratios ^ 
j=^ j will be roughly
the same for all j  0 and will be a consistent estimate of the factor loading or beta of the
fund's true economic returns with respect to the factor t.
Perhaps the most dicult challenge in estimating (67){(69) is to correctly identify the
common factor t. Unlike a simple market-model regression that is meant to estimate
the sensitivity of a fund's returns to a broad-based market index, the ability to distinguish
between the eects of systematic illiquidity and idiosyncratic return smoothing via (67) relies
heavily on the correct specication of the common factor. Using a common factor in (67)
that is highly serially correlated but not exactly the right factor for a given fund may yield
33misleading estimates for the degree of smoothing in that fund's observed returns. Therefore,
the common factor t must be selected or constructed carefully to match the specic risk
exposures of the fund, and the parameter estimates of (67) must be interpreted cautiously
and with several specic alternative hypotheses at hand.
5.3 Specication Checks
Although the maximum likelihood estimator proposed in Section 5.1 has some attractive
properties|it is consistent and asymptotically ecient under certain regularity conditions|
it may not perform well in small samples or when the underlying distribution of true returns
is not normal as hypothesized.20 Moreover, even if normality is satised and a sucient
sample size is available, our proposed smoothing model (21){(23) may simply not apply to
some of the funds in our sample. Therefore, it is important to have certain specication
checks in mind when interpreting the empirical results.
The most obvious specication check is whether or not the maximum likelihood estima-
tion procedure, which involves numerical optimization, converges. If not, this is one sign
that our model is misspecied, either because of non-normality or because the smoothing
process is inappropriate.
A second specication check is whether or not the estimated smoothing coecients are
all positive in sign (we do not impose non-negative restrictions in our estimation procedure,
despite the fact that the specication does assume non-negativity). Estimated coecients
that are negative and signicant may be a sign that the constraint (49) is violated, which
suggests that a somewhat dierent smoothing model may apply.
A third specication check is to compare the smoothing-parameter estimates from the
maximum likelihood approach of Section 5.1 with the linear regression approach of Section
5.2. If the linear single-factor model (20) holds, the two sets of smoothing-parameter esti-
mates should be close. Of course, omitted factors could be a source of discrepancies between
the two sets of estimates, so this specication check must be interpreted cautiously and with
some auxiliary information about the economic motivation for the common factor t.
Finally, a more direct approach to testing the specication of (21){(23) is to impose a
dierent identication condition than (49). Suppose that the standard deviation  of true
returns was observable; then the smoothing parameters  are identied, and a simple check
of the specication (21){(23) is to see whether the estimated parameters ^  sum to 1. Of
20There is substantial evidence that nancial asset returns are not normally distributed, but characterized
by skewness, leptokurtosis, and other non-gaussian properties (see, for example, Lo and MacKinlay, 1999).
Given the dynamic nature of hedge-fund strategies, it would be even less plausible for their returns to be
normally distributed.
34course,  is not observable, but if we had an alternative estimator ~  for , we can achieve
identication of the MA(k) process by imposing the restriction:
 = ~  (70)
instead of (49). If, under this normalization, the smoothing parameter estimates are signi-
cantly dierent, this may be a sign of misspecication.
Of course, the ecacy of this specication check depends on the quality of ~ . We pro-
pose to estimate this quantity by exploiting the fact that the discrepancy between observed
and true returns becomes \small" for multiperiod returns as the number of periods grows.
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and under the specication (21){(23), it is easy to show that the second term on the right
















To estimate this normalized variance of multiperiod observed returns, we can apply Newey

























t   ^ )(R
o
t j   ^ )
!
(74)
where ^  is the sample mean of fRo
tg and m is a truncation lag that must increase with T
but at a slower rate to ensure consistency and asymptotic normality of the estimator. By
35imposing the identication restriction
 = ~  (75)
in estimating the smoothing prole of observed returns, we obtain another estimator of 
which can be compared against the rst. As in the case of the normalization (49), the
alternate normalization (75) can be imposed by rescaling estimates ( ;  ) from standard
MA(k) estimation packages, in this case by dividing each  i by ~ =  and multiplying   by
the same factor.
5.4 Smoothing-Adjusted Sharpe Ratios
One of the main implications of smoothed returns is that Sharpe ratios are biased upward, in
some cases substantially (see Proposition 1).21 The mechanism by which this bias occurs is
through the reduction in volatility because of the smoothing, but there is an additional bias
that occurs when monthly Sharpe ratios are annualized by multiplying by
p
12. If monthly
returns are independently and identically distributed, this is the correct procedure, but Lo
(2002) shows that for non-IID returns, an alternative procedure must be used, one that
accounts for serial correlation in returns in a very specic manner.22 Specically, denote by
Rt(q) the following q-period return:
Rt(q)  Rt + Rt 1 +  + Rt q+1 (76)
21There are a number of other concerns regarding the use and interpretation of Sharpe ratios in the context
of hedge funds. See Agarwal and Naik (2000a, 2002), Goetzmann et al. (2002), Lo (2001), Sharpe (1994),
Spurgin (2001), and Weisman (2002) for examples where Sharpe ratios can be misleading indicators of the
true risk-adjusted performance of hedge-fund strategies, and for alternate methods of constructing optimal
portfolios of hedge funds.
22See also Jobson and Korkie (1981), who were perhaps the rst to derive rigorous statistical properties
of performance measures such as the Sharpe ratio and the Treynor measure.
36where we ignore the eects of compounding for computational convenience.23 For IID re-












q SR : (77)
Using Hansen's (1982) GMM estimator, Lo (2002) derives the asymptotic distribution of
c SR(q) as:
p







; VIID(q) = q VIID = q (1 + 1
2SR
2) : (78)
For non-IID returns, the relation between SR and SR(q) is somewhat more involved
because the variance of Rt(q) is not just the sum of the variances of component returns, but













where kCov[Rt;Rt k]=Var[Rt]. This yields the following relation between SR and SR(q):







Note that (80) reduces to (77) if the autocorrelations fkg are zero, as in the case of IID
returns. However, for non-IID returns, the adjustment factor for time-aggregated Sharpe
ratios is generally not
p
q but a function of the rst q 1 autocorrelations of returns, which




(1 + Rt j)   1 :
For most (but not all) applications, (76) is an excellent approximation. Alternatively, if Rt is dened to be
the continuously compounded return, i.e., Rt  log(Pt=Pt 1) where Pt is the price or net asset value at time
t, then (76) is exact.
37is readily estimated from the sample autocorrelations of returns, hence:







where ^ k is the sample k-th order autocorrelation coecient.
Lo (2002) also derives the asymptotic distribution of (81) under fairly general assumptions
for the returns process (stationarity and ergodicity) using generalized method of moments.
However, in the context of hedge-fund returns, the usual asymptotic approximations may not
be satisfactory because of the small sample sizes that characterize hedge-fund data|a ve-
year track record, which amounts to only 60 monthly observations, is considered quite a long
history in this fast-paced industry. Therefore, we derive an alternative asymptotic distribu-
tion using the continuous-record asymptotics of Richardson and Stock (1989). Specically,
as the sample size T increases without bound, let q grow as well so that the ratio converges
to some nite limit between 0 and 1:
lim
q;T!1
q=T =  2 (0;1) : (82)
This condition is meant to provide an asymptotic approximation that may be more accurate
for small-sample situations, i.e., situations where q is a signicant fraction of T. For example,
in the case of a fund with a ve-year track record, computing an annual Sharpe ratio with
monthly data corresponds to a value of 0.20 for the ratio q=T.
Now as q increases without bound, SR(q) also tends to innity, hence we must renormalize
























where  can be viewed as a kind of long-run average return standard deviation, which is
generally not identical to the unconditional standard deviation  of monthly returns except in
the IID case. To estimate , we can either follow Lo (2002) and use sample autocorrelations




















(Rt   ^ )(Rt j   ^ ) (86)
where ^  is the sample mean of fRtg. For this estimator of , we have the following asymptotic
result:
Proposition 4 As m and T increase without bound so that m=T !  2 (0;1), ^ 
2
NW con-



























From (87), a straightforward computation yields the following expectations:
E[^ 
2
NW] = 1    +
2
3
; E[1=^ NW] 
s
1 + 
1    + 2=3
(88)




q(^    Rf)
^ NW
r
1    + 3=2
1 + 
(89)
and its asymptotic distribution is given by:
Proposition 5 As m, q, and T increase without bound so that m=T !  2 (0;1) and











1    + 3=2
1 + 
(90)
24See Billingsley (1968) for the denition of weak convergence and related results.
39where f(W) is given by (87), SR(q) is given by (83) and W() is standard Brownian motion
dened on [0;1].
Monte Carlo simulations show that the second term of (90) does not account for much bias
when  2 (0; 1
2], and that (90) is an excellent approximation to the small-sample distributions
of Sharpe ratios for non-IID returns.25
6 Empirical Analysis
For our empirical analysis, we use the TASS database of hedge funds which consists of
monthly returns and accompanying information for 2,439 hedge funds (as of January 2001)
from November 1977 to January 2001.26 The database is divided into two parts: \Live"
and \Graveyard" funds. Hedge funds that belong to the Live database are considered to
be active as of January 1, 2001; once a hedge fund decides not to report its performance,
is liquidated, restructured, or merged with other hedge funds, the fund is transferred into
the Graveyard database. A hedge fund can only be listed in the Graveyard database after
being listed in the Live database, but the TASS database is subject to backll bias|when
a fund decides to be included in the database, TASS adds the fund to the Live database
and includes available prior performance of the fund(hedge funds do not need to meet any
specic requirements to be included in the TASS database). Due to reporting delays and
time lags in contacting hedge funds, some Graveyard funds can be incorrectly listed in the
Live database for a period of time. However, TASS has adopted a policy of transferring funds
from the Live to the Graveyard database if they do not report over a 6{8 month period.
As of January 1, 2001, the combined data set of both live and dead hedge funds contained
2,439 funds with at least one monthly net return observation. Out of these 2,439 funds, 1,512
are in the Live database and 927 are in the Graveyard database. The earliest data available
for a fund in either database is November 1, 1977. The Graveyard database became active
only in 1994, i.e., funds that were dropped from the Live database prior to 1994 are not
included in the Graveyard database, which may yield a certain degree of survivorship bias.27
25We have tabulated the percentiles of the distribution of (90) by Monte Carlo simulation for an extensive
combination of values of q, , and  and would be happy to provide them to interested readers upon request.
26For further information about the database and TASS, see http://www.tassresearch.com.
27 For studies attempting to quantify the degree and impact of survivorship bias, see Baquero, Horst, and
Verbeek (2002), Brown, Goetzmann, Ibbotson, and Ross (1992), Brown, Goetzmann, and Ibbotson (1999),
Brown, Goetzmann, and Park (1997), Carpenter and Lynch (1999), Fung and Hsieh (1997b, 2000), Horst,
Nijman, T. and M. Verbeek (2001), Hendricks, Patel, and Zeckhauser (1997), and Schneeweis and Spurgin
(1996).
40A majority of the 2,439 funds reported returns net of various fees on a monthly basis.28
We eliminated 30 funds that reported only gross returns and/or quarterly returns (15 from
each of the Live and Graveyard databases, respectively), leaving 2,409 funds in our sample.
We imposed an additional lter of including only those funds with at least ve years of data,
leaving 651 funds in the Live database and 258 in the Graveyard database for a combined
total of 909 funds. This obviously creates additional survivorship bias in our sample, but
since our main objective is to estimate smoothing proles and not to make inferences about
overall performance, our lter may not be as problematic.29
TASS also attempts to classify funds according to one of 17 dierent investment styles,
listed in Table 5 and described in Appendix A.4; funds that TASS are not able to categorize
are assigned a category code of `0'.30 Table 5 also reports the number of funds in each category
for the Live, Graveyard, and Combined databases, and it is apparent from these gures that
the representation of investment styles is not evenly distributed, but is concentrated among
six categories: US Equity Hedge (162), Event Driven (109), Non-Directional/Relative Value
(85), Pure Managed Futures (93), Pure Emerging Market (72), and Fund of Funds (132).
Together, these six categories account for 72% of the funds in the Combined database.
To develop a sense of the dynamics of the TASS database and the impact of our minimum
return-history lter, in Table 6 we report annual frequency counts of the funds in the database
at the start of each year, funds entering during the year, funds exiting during the year, and
funds entering and exiting within the year. The left panel contains counts for the entire
TASS database, and the right panel contains counts for our sample of 909 funds with at
least ve years of returns. The left panel shows that despite the start date of November
1977, the database is relatively sparsely populated until the 1990's, with the largest increase
in new funds in 1998 and, in the aftermath of the collapse of LTCM, the largest number
of funds exiting the database in 1999 and 2000. The right panel of Table 6 illustrates the
impact of our ve-year lter|the number of funds is considerably smaller, and although the
impact of survivorship bias can be ameliorated by the use of Live and Graveyard funds, our
sample of 909 funds will not include any of the funds started in 1997 and later which is a
substantial proportion of the TASS database.
The attrition rates reported in Table 6 are dened as the ratio of funds exiting in a given
28TASS denes returns as the change in net asset value during the month (assuming the reinvestment of any
distributions on the reinvestment date used by the fund) divided by the net asset value at the beginning of the
month, net of management fees, incentive fees, and other fund expenses. Therefore, these reported returns
should approximate the returns realized by investors. TASS also converts all foreign-currency denominated
returns to US-dollar returns using the appropriate exchange rates.
29See the references in footnote 27.
30A hedge fund can have at most 2 dierent categories (CAT1 and CAT2) in the TASS database. For all
hedge funds in the TASS database, the second category (CAT2) is always 17, `Fund of Funds'.
41Code Category
Number of Funds In:
Combined Live Graveyard
0 Not Categorized 111 44 67
1 US Equity Hedge 162 139 23
2 European Equity Hedge 22 19 3
3 Asian Equity Hedge 5 5 0
4 Global Equity Hedge 27 24 3
5 Dedicated Shortseller 7 6 1
6 Fixed-Income Directional 13 12 1
7 Convertible Fund (Long Only) 15 12 3
8 Event Driven 109 97 12
9 Non-Directional/Relative Value 85 63 22
10 Global Macro 25 15 10
11 Global Opportunity 1 1 0
12 Natural Resources 3 1 2
13 Pure Leveraged Currency 26 15 11
14 Pure Managed Futures 93 28 65
15 Pure Emerging Market 72 54 18
16 Pure Property 1 1 0
17 Fund of Funds 132 115 17
All 909 651 258
Table 5: Number of funds in the TASS Hedge Fund Live and Graveyard databases with at
least ve years of returns history during the period from November 1977 to January 2001.
42year to the number of existing funds at the start of the year. TASS began tracking the exits
of funds starting only in 1994 hence attrition rates could not be computed in prior years. For
the unltered sample of all funds, the average attrition rate from 1994{1999 is 9.11%, which
is very similar to the 8.54% attrition rate obtained by Liang (2001) for the same period. As
observed above, the attrition rate skyrocketed in 2000 in the wake of LTCM's demise. In
the right panel of Table 6, we see smaller attrition rates|the average over the 1994{1999
period is only 3.81%|because of our ve-year minimum return history lter; since many
hedge funds fail in their rst three years, our ltered sample is likely to have a much lower
attrition rate by construction.
Figure 4 contains a visual depiction of the variation in sample sizes of our 909 funds.
The start and end dates of the return history for each fund are connected by a vertical line
and plotted in Figure 4 according to the primary category of the fund|Categories 0{7 in
the top panel and Categories 8{17 in the bottom panel. It is apparent from the increasing
density of the graphs as we move from the bottom to the top that the majority of funds in
our sample are relatively new.
In Section 6.1 we present summary statistics for the sample of hedge funds included in
our analysis. We implement the smoothing prole estimation procedures outlined in Section
5 for each of the funds and summarize the results in Sections 6.2 and 6.3. In Section 6.5 we
report smoothing-adjusted Sharpe ratios for the funds in our sample and compare them to
their unadjusted counterparts.
6.1 Summary Statistics
Table 7 contains basic summary statistics for the 909 funds in our combined extract from
the TASS Live and Graveyard databases. Not surprisingly, there is a great deal of varia-
tion in mean returns and volatilities both across and within categories. For example, the
162 US Equity Hedge funds in our sample exhibited a mean return of 22.53%, but with a
standard deviation of 10.80% in the cross section, and a mean volatility of 21.69% with a
cross-sectional standard deviation of 11.63%. Average serial correlations also vary consider-
ably across categories, but ve categories stand out as having the highest averages:31 Fixed
Income Directional (21.6%), Convertible Fund (Long Only) (22.5%), Event Driven (20.8%),
Non-Directional/Relative Value (18.2%), and Pure Emerging Market (18.8%). Given the
descriptions of these categories provided by TASS (see Appendix A.4) and common wisdom
31At 23.1% and  23:1%, respectively, Global Opportunity and Pure Property have higher rst-order
autocorrelation coecients in absolute value than the other categories, but since these two categories contain
only a single fund each, we set them aside in our discussions.
43Year
All Funds Funds with At Least 5 Years' History
Existing New New Intrayear Total Attrition Existing New New Intrayear Total Attrition
Funds Entries Exits Entry/Exit Funds Rate (%) Funds Entries Exits Entry/Exit Funds Rate (%)
1977 0 1 0 0 1 | 0 1 0 0 1 |
1978 1 2 0 0 3 0:0 1 2 0 0 3 0:0
1979 3 1 0 0 4 0:0 3 1 0 0 4 0:0
1980 4 1 0 0 5 0:0 4 1 0 0 5 0:0
1981 5 3 0 0 8 0:0 5 3 0 0 8 0:0
1982 8 4 0 0 12 0:0 8 4 0 0 12 0:0
1983 12 6 0 0 18 0:0 12 6 0 0 18 0:0
1984 18 14 0 0 32 0:0 18 14 0 0 32 0:0
1985 32 8 0 0 40 0:0 32 8 0 0 40 0:0
1986 40 19 0 0 59 0:0 40 19 0 0 59 0:0
1987 59 32 0 0 91 0:0 59 32 0 0 91 0:0
1988 91 28 0 0 119 0:0 91 28 0 0 119 0:0
1989 119 39 0 0 158 0:0 119 39 0 0 158 0:0
1990 158 99 0 0 257 0:0 158 93 0 0 251 0:0
1991 257 87 0 0 344 0:0 251 78 0 0 329 0:0
1992 344 156 0 0 500 0:0 329 118 0 0 447 0:0
1993 500 233 0 0 733 0:0 447 135 0 0 582 0:0
1994 733 245 28 2 950 3:8 582 153 3 0 732 0:5
1995 950 256 71 1 1135 7:5 732 142 15 0 859 2:0
1996 1135 263 127 9 1271 11:2 859 32 30 0 861 3:5
1997 1271 290 105 7 1456 8:3 861 0 14 0 847 1:6
1998 1456 255 166 10 1545 11:4 847 0 51 0 796 6:0
1999 1545 222 193 7 1574 12:5 796 0 73 0 723 9:2
2000 1574 90 421 19 1243 26:7 723 0 182 0 541 25:2






















































































Figure 4: Length of return histories, depicted by vertical solid lines, for all funds in the TASS
Hedge Fund database with at least ve years of returns during the period from November
1977 to January 2001, ordered by categories 0 to 7 in the top panel and categories 8 to 17
in the bottom panel. Each fund is represented by a single solid vertical line that spans the
start and end dates of the fund's return history.
45about the nature of the strategies involved|these categories include some of the most illiq-
uid securities traded|serial correlation seems to be a reasonable proxy for illiquidity and
smoothed returns. Alternatively, equities and futures are among the most liquid securities in
which hedge funds invest, and not surprising, the average rst-order serial correlation for US
Equity Hedge funds and Pure Managed Futures is 7.8% and  0:1%, respectively. In fact, all
of the equity funds have average serial correlations that are much smaller than those of the
top ve categories. Dedicated Shortseller funds also have a low average rst-order autocor-
relation, 4:4%, which is consistent with the high degree of liquidity that often characterize
shortsellers (since, by denition, the ability to short a security implies a certain degree of
liquidity).
These summary statistics suggest that illiquidity and smoothed returns may be important
attributes for hedge-fund returns which can be captured to some degree by serial correlation
and our time-series model of smoothing.
6.2 Smoothing Prole Estimates
Using the methods outlined in Section 5, we estimate the smoothing model (21){(23) and
summarize the results in Tables 8{9. Our maximum likelihood procedure|programmed in
Matlab using the Optimization Toolbox and replicated in Stata using its MA(k) estimation
routine|converged without diculty for all but one of the 909 funds:32 fund 1055, a Global
Macro fund with returns from June 1994 to January 2001 for which the maximum likelihood
estimation procedure yielded the following parameter estimates:
^ 0 = 490:47 ; ^ 1 =  352:63 ; ^ 2 =  136:83
which suggests that our MA(2) model is severely misspecied for this fund. Therefore, we
drop this fund from our sample and for the remainder of our analysis, we focus on the
smoothing prole estimates for the remaining 908 funds in our sample.33
32We also constrain our maximum likelihood estimators to yield invertible MA(2) processes, and this
constraint was binding for only two funds: 1711 and 4298.
33The apparent source of the problem in this case is two consecutive outliers, 39.4% in December 1999
followed by  27:6% in January 2000 (these are monthly returns, not annualized). The eect of two outliers
on the parameter estimates of the MA(2) model (21){(23) is to pull the values of the coecients in opposite
directions so as to t the extreme reversals. We contacted TASS to investigate these outliers and were
informed that they were data errors. We also checked the remaining 908 funds in our sample for similar
outliers, i.e., consecutive extreme returns of opposite sign, and found none. We also computed the maximum
and minimum monthly returns for each fund in our sample, ranked the 908 funds according to these maxima
and minima, and checked the parameter estimates of the top and bottom 10 funds, and none exhibited the
extreme behavior of fund 1055's parameter estimates.
46Category N
Annual Mean Annual SD Skewness Kurtosis ^ 1(%) ^ 2(%) ^ 3(%) p-Value(Q)
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
Not Categorized 111 10:78 6:99 15:60 11:25 0:12 1:06 3:67 4:94 5:5 17:0 0:9 14:7 0:5 11:4 36:1 30:4
US Equity Hedge 162 22:53 10:80 21:69 11:63 0:17 0:96 3:82 5:02 7:8 13:5 0:6 11:2  4:2 11:0 33:9 28:8
European Equity Hedge 22 18:01 7:15 14:71 6:41 0:39 0:81 2:97 2:73 12:7 10:9 11:2 11:3  2:0 8:9 21:2 23:0
Asian Equity Hedge 5 9:16 7:96 21:13 6:64 0:50 0:85 2:32 0:73 11:7 13:0 5:0 5:6  5:4 13:4 40:2 21:1
Global Equity Hedge 27 13:71 8:41 17:41 6:61  0:24 1:06 3:96 5:60 12:4 11:3  0:1 9:6  2:7 7:2 41:9 27:2
Dedicated Shortseller 7 0:33 10:26 21:55 13:80 0:49 0:20 2:28 2:40 4:4 8:4  2:7 9:5  6:5 6:9 31:8 27:7
Fixed-Income Directional 13 9:82 3:49 9:55 8:74  0:94 1:29 5:37 7:32 21:6 15:7 14:1 13:2 1:9 13:6 18:1 21:0
Convertible Fund (Long Only) 15 14:95 5:33 11:03 6:76  0:19 1:68 6:14 9:97 22:5 12:3 6:2 13:4  2:1 12:5 17:2 25:2
Event Driven 109 15:35 6:70 9:51 9:65  0:58 1:82 8:26 11:68 20:8 16:8 6:4 13:4  0:1 12:3 25:7 29:6
Non-Directional/Relative Value 85 12:54 6:65 8:19 5:05  0:76 1:71 6:44 9:50 18:2 23:5 12:2 15:4 5:0 14:5 17:1 25:0
Global Macro 25 16:75 7:94 18:92 9:53 0:53 1:03 4:66 6:82 7:2 15:0  0:1 10:8  0:9 8:1 33:4 22:9
Global Opportunity 1  17:39 | 31:03 |  0:48 | 2:80 | 23:1 | 14:1 | 0:0 | 20:8 |
Natural Resources 3 11:39 4:89 18:91 1:06 0:48 0:44 1:25 1:49 5:0 14:5 8:5 12:1 1:9 7:0 47:6 43:7
Pure Leveraged Currency 26 9:29 7:11 17:18 8:93 0:44 1:08 3:50 4:92 5:2 8:7  6:2 9:5  4:4 8:1 35:5 26:6
Pure Managed Futures 93 9:60 9:28 21:74 17:06 0:22 1:35 4:93 8:31  0:1 12:9  3:8 10:0  3:5 10:7 35:4 29:1
Pure Emerging Market 72 9:57 10:94 26:60 14:44  0:69 1:49 6:17 8:05 18:8 11:8 4:4 11:6  1:4 9:0 32:6 30:6
Pure Property 1 3:96 | 9:41 |  1:33 | 5:43 |  23:1 | 2:3 | 7:3 | 18:9 |
Fund of Funds 132 11:04 5:16 10:07 5:63  0:26 1:30 4:78 6:16 17:6 14:1 5:7 11:5  0:7 9:3 26:3 27:5
All 909 13:72 9:46 16:06 12:21  0:15 1:38 5:05 7:56 12:1 16:8 3:4 13:1  1:2 11:2 30:1 28:7
Table 7: Means and standard deviations of basic summary statistics for 909 hedge funds in the TASS Hedge Fund Combined
(Live and Graveyard) database with at least ve years of returns history during the period from November 1977 to January
2001. The columns `p-Value(Q)' contain means and standard deviations of p-values for the Box-Pierce Q-statistic for each
fund using the rst 6 autocorrelations of returns.
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7Table 8 contains summary statistics for maximum likelihood estimate of the smoothing
parameters (0;1;2) and smoothing index , Table 12 reports comparable statistics for
the regression estimates of the smoothing parameters under the assumption of a linear one-
factor model for true returns, and Table 9 presents the maximum likelihood estimates of the
smoothing model for the 50 most illiquid funds of the 908 funds, as ranked by ^ 0.
The left panel of Table 8 reports summary statistics for the maximum likelihood estimates
under the normalization (49) where the smoothing coecients sum to 1, and the right panel
reports the same statistics for the maximum likelihood estimates under the normalization
(75) where the variance 2
 is set equal to a nonparametric estimate ~ 2
 given by (74). A
comparison of the right and left panels reveals roughly similar characteristics, indicating the
general equivalence of these two normalization methods and the fact that the smoothing
model (21){(23) may be a reasonable specication for hedge-fund returns.34
Table 8 shows that seven categories seem to exhibit smaller average values of ^ 0 than
the rest|European Equity Hedge (0.82), Fixed-Income Directional (0.76), Convertible Fund
(Long Only) (0.84), Event Driven (0.81), Non-Directional/Relative Value (0.82), Pure Emerg-
ing Market (0.83), and Fund of Funds (0.85).35 Consider, in particular, the Fixed-Income
Directional category, which has a mean of 0.76 for ^ 0. This is, of course, the average across all
13 funds in this category, but if it were the point estimate of a given fund, it would imply that
only 76% of that fund's true current monthly return would be reported, with the remaining
24% distributed over the next two months (recall the constraint that ^ 0 + ^ 1 + ^ 2 = 1). The
estimates 0.15 and 0.08 for ^ 1 and ^ 2 imply that on average, the current reported return also
includes 15% of last month's true return and 8% of the true return two months ago.36 These
averages suggest a signicant amount of smoothing and illiquidity in this category, and are
approximated by the geometric smoothing model of Section 4.2 with =0:25 (see Table 4).
Recall from Table 4 that in this case, with k=2, the impact of geometric smoothing was a
24% decrease in the market beta and a 27% increase in the Sharpe ratio of observed returns.
Overall, the summary statistics in Table 8 are broadly consistent with common intuition
about the nature of the strategies and securities involved in these fund categories, which
contain the most illiquid securities and, therefore, have the most potential for smoothed
returns.
34However, Table 8 contains only summary statistics, not the maximum likelihood estimators of individual
funds, hence dierences in the two normalizations for given funds may not be apparent from this table. In
particular, side-by-side comparisons of maximum likelihood estimates for an individual under these two nor-
malizations may still be a useful specication check despite the broad similarities that these two approaches
seem to exhibit in Table 8.
35We omit the Global Opportunity category from our discussions because it consists of only a single fund.
36The averages do not sum to 1 exactly because of rounding errors.
48Category N
MA(2) with Constrained Sum MA(2) with Constrained 
^ 0 ^ 1 ^ 2 ^  ^ 0 ^ 1 ^ 2 ^ 
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
Not Categorized 111 1:04 0:33 0:01 0:18  0:05 0:23 1:27 1:06 0:97 0:27 0:01 0:16  0:04 0:19 1:08 0:60
US Equity Hedge 162 0:95 0:21 0:06 0:15  0:01 0:15 1:00 0:54 0:98 0:20 0:07 0:14  0:01 0:15 1:04 0:42
European Equity Hedge 22 0:82 0:15 0:08 0:09 0:11 0:11 0:72 0:28 0:90 0:17 0:09 0:10 0:13 0:12 0:88 0:32
Asian Equity Hedge 5 0:94 0:30 0:05 0:19 0:01 0:11 1:00 0:71 0:90 0:20 0:06 0:17 0:01 0:10 0:88 0:40
Global Equity Hedge 27 0:91 0:14 0:11 0:10  0:02 0:09 0:88 0:27 0:96 0:20 0:11 0:10  0:02 0:09 0:99 0:37
Dedicated Shortseller 7 1:03 0:20 0:03 0:12  0:06 0:13 1:12 0:48 1:13 0:14 0:05 0:12  0:05 0:14 1:33 0:34
Fixed-Income Directional 13 0:76 0:17 0:15 0:10 0:08 0:12 0:67 0:27 0:75 0:21 0:15 0:10 0:09 0:12 0:66 0:30
Convertible Fund (Long Only) 15 0:84 0:35 0:18 0:08  0:02 0:35 0:98 1:36 0:89 0:27 0:20 0:10 0:00 0:24 0:97 0:58
Event Driven 109 0:81 0:17 0:15 0:13 0:04 0:11 0:74 0:28 0:84 0:24 0:16 0:12 0:04 0:11 0:82 0:44
Non-Directional/Relative Value 85 0:82 0:24 0:09 0:25 0:09 0:14 0:82 0:62 0:77 0:27 0:09 0:24 0:08 0:13 0:75 0:70
Global Macro 24 0:95 0:18 0:08 0:11  0:03 0:15 0:99 0:40 0:97 0:23 0:08 0:10  0:03 0:17 1:03 0:51
Global Opportunity 1 0:74 | 0:16 | 0:10 | 0:58 | 0:63 | 0:14 | 0:09 | 0:43 |
Natural Resources 3 0:91 0:19 0:02 0:11 0:07 0:09 0:87 0:34 0:85 0:04 0:03 0:10 0:08 0:10 0:74 0:04
Pure Leveraged Currency 26 1:10 0:34 0:03 0:13  0:13 0:25 1:41 1:38 1:00 0:16 0:04 0:10  0:10 0:16 1:07 0:37
Pure Managed Futures 93 1:13 0:32  0:05 0:22  0:08 0:18 1:47 1:19 1:10 0:25  0:03 0:18  0:07 0:16 1:33 0:63
Pure Emerging Market 72 0:83 0:16 0:15 0:09 0:02 0:13 0:76 0:31 0:79 0:17 0:14 0:08 0:02 0:13 0:70 0:30
Pure Property 1 1:23 |  0:31 | 0:07 | 1:62 | 0:95 |  0:24 | 0:06 | 0:96 |
Fund of Funds 132 0:85 0:21 0:13 0:13 0:03 0:13 0:81 0:50 0:85 0:23 0:13 0:12 0:03 0:13 0:83 0:45
All 908 0:92 0:26 0:08 0:17 0:00 0:17 0:98 0:76 0:91 0:25 0:08 0:16 0:01 0:15 0:95 0:53
Table 8: Means and standard deviations of maximum likelihood estimates of MA(2) smoothing process Ro
t = 0Rt +1Rt 1 +
2Rt 2,   2
0 +2
1 +2
2, for 908 hedge funds in the TASS combined database with at least ve years of returns history during
the period from November 1977 to January 2001.
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9Code Category Period T Status ^ 0 SE(^ 0) ^ 1 SE(^ 1) ^ 2 SE(^ 2) ^ 
1201 Non-Directional/Relative Value 199409{200101 77 1 0:464 0:040 0:365 0:025 0:171 0:047 0:378
4346 Event Driven 199412{200011 71 1 0:471 0:041 0:335 0:029 0:195 0:048 0:371
180 Not Categorized 198906{199608 87 0 0:485 0:041 0:342 0:027 0:173 0:046 0:382
1204 Non-Directional/Relative Value 199510{200101 64 1 0:492 0:049 0:339 0:033 0:169 0:055 0:386
1584 Fund of Funds 199601{200101 61 1 0:504 0:046 0:245 0:040 0:251 0:051 0:377
518 Non-Directional/Relative Value 199312{200005 78 0 0:514 0:034 0:142 0:037 0:343 0:037 0:403
971 Non-Directional/Relative Value 199409{200012 76 1 0:515 0:038 0:176 0:038 0:309 0:041 0:392
1234 Fund of Funds 199410{200012 75 1 0:527 0:061 0:446 0:020 0:027 0:061 0:477
2185 Fixed Income Directional 199108{200101 114 1 0:532 0:040 0:265 0:032 0:202 0:043 0:395
26 Non-Directional/Relative Value 199303{200101 95 1 0:533 0:047 0:305 0:033 0:162 0:050 0:403
171 Non-Directional/Relative Value 199304{200101 94 1 0:536 0:040 0:193 0:037 0:271 0:043 0:398
1696 Fund of Funds 199501{200001 61 0 0:536 0:067 0:406 0:030 0:058 0:068 0:456
120 Non-Directional/Relative Value 198207{199810 196 0 0:546 0:032 0:238 0:026 0:215 0:034 0:402
1396 Non-Directional/Relative Value 199507{200101 67 1 0:548 0:056 0:255 0:044 0:197 0:059 0:404
2774 Non-Directional/Relative Value 199501{200006 66 0 0:553 0:058 0:262 0:044 0:185 0:061 0:409
1397 Non-Directional/Relative Value 199410{200101 76 1 0:556 0:055 0:260 0:042 0:184 0:057 0:410
57 Non-Directional/Relative Value 199210{200101 100 1 0:561 0:052 0:311 0:034 0:127 0:053 0:428
4158 Event Driven 199510{200101 64 1 0:565 0:062 0:261 0:046 0:174 0:064 0:417
1773 Fund of Funds 199506{200101 68 1 0:569 0:056 0:194 0:049 0:238 0:058 0:417
415 Not Categorized 198807{199608 98 0 0:570 0:054 0:306 0:035 0:124 0:055 0:434
1713 Fixed Income Directional 199601{200101 61 1 0:573 0:067 0:269 0:048 0:158 0:068 0:426
1576 Fund of Funds 199504{200010 67 1 0:575 0:066 0:293 0:044 0:132 0:067 0:434
1633 Event Driven 199304{199901 70 0 0:576 0:066 0:309 0:042 0:115 0:066 0:440
1883 Event Driven 199306{200101 92 1 0:578 0:053 0:236 0:041 0:187 0:054 0:424
1779 Non-Directional/Relative Value 199512{200101 62 1 0:584 0:067 0:241 0:051 0:175 0:068 0:429
3860 Fund of Funds 199511{200101 63 1 0:584 0:064 0:207 0:053 0:210 0:065 0:428
482 Non-Directional/Relative Value 199406{200101 80 1 0:584 0:060 0:253 0:044 0:163 0:060 0:432
2755 US Equity Hedge 199203{200010 104 1 0:584 0:057 0:321 0:034 0:095 0:056 0:453
1968 Fund of Funds 199402{200012 83 1 0:587 0:060 0:253 0:044 0:160 0:060 0:434
1240 Fund of Funds 199405{200101 81 1 0:592 0:055 0:168 0:049 0:240 0:056 0:436
1884 Event Driven 199301{200101 97 1 0:592 0:059 0:298 0:038 0:110 0:058 0:451
2864 Non-Directional/Relative Value 199408{200101 78 1 0:598 0:064 0:255 0:046 0:147 0:064 0:444
1 Non-Directional/Relative Value 199101{200101 121 1 0:600 0:051 0:241 0:038 0:159 0:051 0:444
412 Pure Emerging Market 199211{200101 99 1 0:600 0:061 0:318 0:036 0:082 0:059 0:468
1046 Pure Emerging Market 199406{200101 80 1 0:603 0:058 0:169 0:051 0:228 0:058 0:444
2570 Event Driven 199001{200101 133 1 0:604 0:046 0:171 0:039 0:225 0:046 0:445
945 Fund of Funds 199210{200101 100 1 0:605 0:060 0:273 0:040 0:122 0:058 0:456
1994 Non-Directional/Relative Value 199507{200101 67 1 0:606 0:069 0:217 0:053 0:177 0:068 0:446
1691 Event Driven 199310{200101 88 0 0:610 0:062 0:232 0:046 0:158 0:061 0:451
34 Non-Directional/Relative Value 199209{200101 101 1 0:612 0:052 0:143 0:047 0:245 0:052 0:455
2630 Non-Directional/Relative Value 199001{200101 133 1 0:612 0:052 0:255 0:036 0:133 0:051 0:457
2685 US Equity Hedge 199207{200101 103 1 0:613 0:060 0:271 0:040 0:116 0:058 0:463
2549 Non-Directional/Relative Value 199408{200101 78 1 0:614 0:079 0:412 0:029  0:026 0:069 0:547
490 Event Driven 199404{199908 65 0 0:615 0:074 0:237 0:054 0:148 0:072 0:456
3099 Convertible Fund (Long Only) 199501{200101 73 1 0:615 0:060 0:121 0:057 0:263 0:060 0:463
1326 US Equity Hedge 199601{200101 61 1 0:619 0:069 0:145 0:062 0:236 0:068 0:460
1418 Fund of Funds 199301{199804 64 0 0:621 0:085 0:363 0:041 0:016 0:078 0:518
3712 Not Categorized 199304{200101 94 1 0:625 0:062 0:211 0:047 0:164 0:060 0:462
1534 Fund of Funds 199402{200101 84 1 0:625 0:068 0:246 0:048 0:129 0:065 0:468
167 Event Driven 199207{200101 103 1 0:627 0:061 0:239 0:044 0:134 0:059 0:468
Table 9: First 50 funds of ranked list of 908 hedge funds in the TASS Hedge Fund Combined
(Live and Graveyard) database with at least ve years of returns history during the period
from November 1977 to January 2001, ranked in increasing order of the estimated smoothing
parameter ^ 0 of the MA(2) smoothing process Ro
t = 0Rt + 1Rt 1 + 2Rt 2, subject to the
normalization 1 = 0 + 1 + 2, and estimated via maximum likelihood.
50Table 9 provides a more direct view of illiquidity and smoothed returns by reporting
the smoothing parameter estimates for the top 50 funds ranked by ^ 0. In contrast to the
averages of Table 8, the parameter estimates of 0 among these 50 funds range from 0.464 to
0.627, implying that only half to two-thirds of the current month's true returns are re
ected
in observed returns. The asymptotic standard errors are generally quite small, ranging from
0.032 to 0.085, hence the smoothing parameters seem to be estimated reasonably precisely.
The funds in Table 9 fall mainly into three categories: Non-Directional/Relative Value,
Event Driven, and Fund of Funds. Together, these three categories account for 40 of the
50 funds in Table 9. A more complete summary of the distribution of smoothing parameter
estimates across the dierent fund categories is provided in Figures 5 and 6. Figure 5
contains a graph of the smoothing coecients ^ 0 for all 908 funds by category, and Figure 6
contains a similar graph for the smoothing index ^ . These gures show that although there
is considerable variation within each category, nevertheless, some dierences emerge between
categories. For example, categories 6{9, 15, and 17 (Fixed-Income Directional, Convertible
Fund (Long Only), Event Driven Non-Directional/Relative Value, Pure Emerging Market,
and Fund of Funds, respectively), have clearly discernible concentrations that are lower than
the other categories, suggesting more illiquid funds and more smoothed returns. On the
other hand, categories 1, 4, and 14 (US Equity Hedge, Global Equity Hedge, and Pure
Managed Futures, respectively) have concentrations that are at the upper end, suggesting
just the opposite|more liquidity and less return-smoothing. The smoothing index estimates
^  plotted in Figure 6 show similar patterns of concentration and dispersion within and
between the categories.
To develop further intuition for the smoothing model (21){(23) and the possible interpre-
tations of the smoothing parameter estimates, we apply the same estimation procedure to
the returns of the Ibbotson stock and bond indexes, the CSFB/Tremont hedge-fund indexes,
and two mutual funds, the highly liquid Vanguard 500 Index Fund, and the considerably less
liquid American Express Extra Income Fund.37 Table 10 contains summary statistics and
37As of January 31, 2003, the net assets of the Vanguard 500 Index Fund (ticker symbol: VFINX) and the
AXP Extra Income Fund (ticker symbol: INEAX) are given by http://nance.yahoo.com/ as $59.7 billion
and $1.5 billion, respectively, and the descriptions of the two funds are as follows:
\The Vanguard 500 Index Fund seeks investment results that correspond with the price and yield per-
formance of the S&P 500 Index. The fund employs a passive management strategy designed to track the
performance of the S&P 500 Index, which is dominated by the stocks of large U.S. companies. It attempts
to replicate the target index by investing all or substantially all of its assets in the stocks that make up the
index."
\AXP Extra Income Fund seeks high current income; capital appreciation is secondary. The fund ordinarily
invests in long-term high-yielding, lower-rated corporate bonds. These bonds may be issued by U.S. and
foreign companies and governments. The fund may invest in other instruments such as: money market
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Figure 5: Estimated smoothing coecients ^ 0 for all funds in the TASS Hedge Fund database
with at least ve years of returns during the period from November 1977 to January 2001,
ordered by categories 0 to 17. The two panels dier only in the range of the vertical axis,
which is smaller for the lower panel so as to provide ner visual resolution of the distribution
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Figure 6: Estimated smoothing index ^  for all funds in the TASS Hedge Fund database with
at least ve years of returns during the period from November 1977 to January 2001, ordered
by categories 0 to 17. The two panels dier only in the range of the vertical axis, which
is smaller for the lower panel so as to provide ner visual resolution of the distribution of
estimated smoothing indexes in the sample.
53smoothing-coecient estimates for these index and mutual-fund returns.
Consistent with our interpretation of ^ 0 as an indicator of liquidity, the returns of the
most liquid portfolios in the rst panel of Table 10|the Ibbotson Large Company Index, the
Vanguard 500 Index Fund (which is virtually identical to the Ibbotson Large Company Index,
except for sample period and tracking error), and the Ibbotson Long-Term Government Bond
Index|have parameter estimates near 1.00: 0.92 for the Ibbotson Large Company Index,
1.12 for the Vanguard 500 Index Fund, and 0.92 for the Ibbotson Long-Term Government
Bond Index. The rst-order autocorrelation coecients also conrm their lack of serial
correlation; 9.8% for the Ibbotson Large Company Index,  2:3% for the Vanguard 500
Index Fund, and 6.7% for the Ibbotson Long-Term Government Bond Index. Moreover,
the values of ^ 0 of the less liquid portfolios are less than 1.00: 0.82 for the Ibbotson Small
Company Index, 0.84 for the Ibbotson Long-Term Corporate Bond Index, and 0.67 for the
American Express Extra Income Fund, and their rst-order serial correlation coecients are
15:6%, 15:6%, and 35:4%, respectively, considerably higher than those of the more liquid
portfolios.
The results for the CSFB Hedge Fund Indexes in the second panel of Table 10 are also
consistent with the empirical results in Tables 8 and 9|indexes corresponding to hedge-fund
strategies involving less liquid securities tend to have lower ^ 0's. For example, the smoothing-
parameter estimates ^ 0 of the Convertible Arbitrage, Emerging Markets, and Fixed-Income
Arbitrage Indexes are 0.49, 0.75, and 0.63, respectively, and rst-order serial correlation
coecients of 42:6%, 29:4%, and 39:6%, respectively. In contrast, the smoothing-parameter
estimates of the more liquid hedge-fund strategies such as Dedicated Short Bias and Man-
aged Futures are 0.99 and 1.04, respectively, with rst-order serial correlation coecients of
7:8% and 3:2%, respectively. While these ndings are generally consistent with the results
in Tables 8 and 9, it should be noted that the process of aggregation can change the sta-
tistical behavior of any time series. For example, Granger (1980, 1988) observes that the
aggregation of a large number of stationary autoregressive processes can yield a time series
that exhibits long-term memory, characterized by serial correlation coecients that decay
very slowly (hyperbolically, as opposed to geometrically as in the case of a stationary ARMA
process). Therefore, while it is true that the aggregation of a collection of illiquid funds will
generally yield an index with smoothed returns,38 the reverse need not be true|smoothed
index returns need not imply that all of the funds comprising the index are illiquid. The
and common stocks."
38It is, of course, possible that the smoothing coecients of some funds may exactly oset those of other
funds so as to reduce the degree of smoothing in an aggregate index. However, such a possibility is extremely
remote and pathological if each of the component funds exhibits a high degree of smoothing.
54latter inference can only be made with the benet of additional information|essentially
identication restrictions|about the statistical relations among the funds in the index, i.e.,
covariances and possibly other higher-order co-moments, or the existence of common factors
driving fund returns.
The patterns in Table 10 conrm our interpretation of smoothing coecients and serial
correlation as proxies for liquidity, and suggest that there may be broader applications of
our model of smoothed returns to other investment strategies and asset classes.
6.3 Cross-Sectional Regressions
A more quantitative summary of the cross-sectional properties of the smoothing parameter
estimates for the 908 funds is given in Table 11, which contains the results of cross-sectional
regressions of the smoothing parameter ^ 0 and the smoothing index ^  on a number of 0/1
indicator variables.39 In the rst two regressions, ^ 0 and ^  are the dependent variables,
respectively, and the regressors include a constant term, 17 indicator variables corresponding
to the 17 hedge-fund categories dened by TASS (see Appendix A.4), and an indicator
variable that takes on the value 1 if the fund is open and 0 if it is closed to new investors. The
third and fourth regressions have the same dependent variables|^ 0 and ^ , respectively|and
include the same regressors as the rst two regressions but also include 0/1 indicator variables
that indicate whether the fund is US-based (USBASED), and whether the geographical focus
of the fund is global (GF-GLB), US (GF-USA), Asia/Pacic (GF-APC), Western Europe
(GF-WEU), Eastern Europe (GF-EEU), and Africa (GF-AFR).
The results of the rst regression are consistent with the general intuition gleaned from
Figures 5 and 6. The category indicator variables with the most negative coecients that are
statistically signicant at the 5% level are European Equity Hedge ( 0:212), Fixed-Income
Directional ( 0:262), Event Driven ( 0:218), Non-Directional/Relative Value ( 0:211),
Pure Emerging Market ( 0:195), Fund of Funds ( 0:178), implying that on average, funds
in these categories have smaller smoothing coecients ^ 0, i.e., less liquidity or smoother
returns. These point estimates can be used to approximate the marginal impact that a
given investment style has on the smoothing prole of the fund's monthly returns. For ex-
ample, from a no-smoothing baseline of 1, conditioning on belonging to the Fixed-Income
Directional category yields an expected smoothing parameter ^ 0 of 1 0:262=0:738 and an
expected smoothing index of ^  of 1 0:583=0:417, other things equal (and assuming that
the remaining indicator variables in the two regression equations are 0).
39To conserve space, we report regression results only for the maximum likelihood estimates under the con-
straint (49). Table A.8 of the Appendix reports corresponding results for the maximum likelihood estimates
under the alternate constraint (75).
55Series Period T Mean SD ^ 1 ^ 2 ^ 3 ^  R2
^ 0 SE(^ 0) ^ 1 SE(^ 1) ^ 2 SE(^ 2) ^ 
(%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%)
Ibbotson Small Company 192601{200112 912 1:35 8:63 15:6 1:7  10:6 1:27 66:9 0:82 0:03 0:13 0:02 0:04 0:03 0:69
Ibbotson Long-Term Government Bonds 192601{200112 912 0:46 2:22 6:7 0:3  8:3 0:07 2:8 0:92 0:05 0:06 0:03 0:01 0:03 0:86
Ibbotson Long-Term Corporate Bonds 192601{200112 912 0:49 1:96 15:6 0:3  6:0 0:08 5:2 0:84 0:04 0:14 0:02 0:02 0:03 0:73
Ibbotson Large Company 192601{200112 912 1:03 5:57 9:8  3:2  10:7 1:00 100:0 0:92 0:05 0:09 0:03  0:01 0:03 0:85
AXP Extra Income Fund (INEAX) 198401{200112 216 0:67 2:04 35:4 13:1 2:5 0:21 20:7 0:67 0:03 0:24 0:03 0:09 0:04 0:51
Vanguard 500 Index Trust (VFINX) 197609{200112 304 1:16 4:36  2:3  6:8  3:2 1:00 100:0 1:12 0:17  0:03 0:07  0:09 0:07 1:26
CSFB/Tremont Indices:
Aggregate Hedge Fund Index 199401{200210 106 0:87 2:58 11:2 4:1  0:4 0:31 24:9 0:86 0:12 0:09 0:08 0:04 0:08 0:76
Convertible Arbitrage 199401{200210 106 0:81 1:40 56:6 42:6 15:6 0:03 1:1 0:49 0:01 0:26 0:03 0:25 0:03 0:37
Dedicated Short Bias 199401{200210 106 0:22 5:29 7:8  6:3  5:0  0:94 58:6 0:99 0:20 0:08 0:09  0:07 0:10 0:99
Emerging Markets 199401{200210 106 0:54 5:38 29:4 1:2  2:1 0:62 24:0 0:75 0:08 0:24 0:05 0:01 0:07 0:62
Equity Market Neutral 199401{200210 106 0:89 0:92 29:4 18:1 8:4 0:10 21:1 0:71 0:06 0:18 0:05 0:12 0:06 0:54
Event Driven 199401{200210 106 0:83 1:81 34:8 14:7 3:8 0:23 30:2 0:68 0:05 0:23 0:05 0:09 0:06 0:52
Fixed Income Arbitrage 199401{200210 106 0:55 1:18 39:6 10:8 5:4 0:02 0:7 0:63 0:04 0:28 0:04 0:08 0:05 0:49
Global Macro 199401{200210 106 1:17 3:69 5:6 4:6 8:3 0:24 7:5 0:91 0:14 0:04 0:08 0:05 0:08 0:84
Long/Short 199401{200210 106 0:98 3:34 15:9 5:9  4:6 0:48 36:7 0:82 0:10 0:13 0:07 0:06 0:07 0:68
Managed Futures 199401{200210 106 0:55 3:44 3:2  6:3 0:7  0:12 2:5 1:04 0:23 0:04 0:10  0:08 0:11 1:08
Table 10: Summary statistics and maximum likelihood estimates of MA(2) smoothing process Ro




2, subject to the normalization 1 = 0 + 1 + 2, for the returns of various indexes and two mutual funds, the
Vanguard 500 Index Trust (which tracks the S&P 500 index) and the AXP Extra Income Fund (which focuses on high current
income and invests in long-term high-yielding lower-rated corporate bonds).
5
6In contrast, the coecients for Dedicated Shortseller and Pure Leveraged Currency
indicators|0.001 and 0.069, respectively, with t-statistics of 0.01 and 0.11, respectively|
are positive and statistically insignicant at the 5% level , which is consistent with common
intuition about the liquidity of these types of funds. Moreover, the coecient for the Pure
Managed Futures indicator is both positive and signicant at the 5% level|0.101 with a
t-statistic of 3.00|which is also consistent with the intuition that managed futures involve
relatively liquid securities with well established marks that cannot easily be manipulated.
The last indicator variable included in the rst two regressions takes on the value 1 if the
fund is open to new investors and 0 if closed. If return-smoothing is actively being pursued,
we might expect it to be more important for funds that are open since such funds are still
attempting to attract new investors. This implies that the coecient for this indicator
variable should be negative|open funds should be more prone to smoothing than closed
funds. Table 11 conrms this hypothesis: the estimated coecient for OPEN is  0:040 with
a t-statistic of 2.03, implying that funds open to new investors have a smoothing coecient
^ 0 that is lower by 0.040 on average than funds that are closed. An alternate interpretation
is that funds that are still open to new investors are typically those with smaller assets under
management, and as a result, are less likely to be able to aord costly third-party valuations
of illiquid securities in their portfolios. Unfortunately, many funds in the TASS database do
not report assets under management so we were unable to investigate this alternative.
The third and fourth regressions in Table 11 include additional indicator variables that
capture the fund's geographical base as well as the geographical focus of its investments, and
we see that being in the US has a positive marginal impact on the conditional mean of ^ 0,
but being US-focused in its investments has a negative marginal impact. The latter result is
somewhat counterintuitive but becomes less puzzling in light of the fact that approximately
46% of the funds are US-focused, hence many of the most illiquid funds are included in this
category. Apart from this indicator, the geographical aspects of our sample of funds seem
to have little impact on the cross-sectional variability in smoothing parameter estimates.
With R2's ranging from 9.0% to 17.7%, the regressions in Table 11 leave considerable
cross-sectional variation unexplained, but this is no surprise given the noise inherent in the
category assignments and the heterogeneity of investment styles even within each category.
However, the general pattern of coecients and t-statistics do suggest that the smoothing
coecients are capturing signicant features of the cross section of hedge fund returns in
our sample.
The nal set of empirical estimates of the smoothing process (21){(23) is for the linear
regression model of Section 5.2, and is summarized in Table 12. Recall from Section 5.2
that the linear-regression estimates of (0;1;2) are based on the assumption that true
57Regressor ^ 0 ^  ^ 0 ^ 
Constant 1:059 1:314 1:086 1:407
(42:05) (17:26) (35:62) (15:21)
US Equity Hedge  0:077  0:255  0:076  0:257
(2:56) (2:82) (2:36) (2:62)
European Equity Hedge  0:212  0:531  0:260  0:676
(3:79) (3:14) (4:06) (3:48)
Asian Equity Hedge  0:086  0:254  0:076  0:248
(0:78) (0:77) (0:65) (0:71)
Global Equity Hedge  0:113  0:366  0:084  0:294
(2:19) (2:35) (1:55) (1:80)
Dedicated Shortseller 0:001  0:128 0:001  0:130
(0:01) (0:45) (0:01) (0:46)
Fixed-Income Directional  0:262  0:583  0:258  0:575
(3:73) (2:75) (3:64) (2:67)
Convertible Fund (Long Only)  0:180  0:264  0:188  0:289
(2:73) (1:32) (2:83) (1:44)
Event Driven  0:218  0:514  0:223  0:527
(6:69) (5:23) (6:57) (5:12)
Non-Directional/Relative Value  0:211  0:432  0:194  0:399
(6:07) (4:12) (5:37) (3:64)
Global Macro  0:075  0:271  0:049  0:230
(1:38) (1:66) (0:86) (1:33)
Global Opportunity  0:282  0:656  0:275  0:647
(1:17) (0:9) (1:14) (0:89)
Natural Resources  0:109  0:363  0:112  0:372
(0:78) (0:86) (0:8) (0:87)
Pure Leveraged Currency 0:069 0:152 0:073 0:158
(1:32) (0:96) (1:37) (0:98)
Pure Managed Futures 0:101 0:210 0:116 0:244
(3:00) (2:06) (3:29) (2:29)
Pure Emerging Market  0:195  0:486  0:189  0:481
(5:34) (4:40) (4:33) (3:63)
Pure Property 0:173 0:304 0:195 0:339
(0:72) (0:42) (0:80 (0:46)
Fund of Funds  0:178  0:433  0:170  0:419
(5:66) (4:57) (5:28) (4:29)
OPEN  0:040  0:077  0:024  0:041















Sample Size 908 908 891 891
Adjusted R2(%) 16.5 9.0 17.7 9.9
Table 11: Regressions of maximum likelihood estimated smoothing coecient ^ 0 and smooth-
ing index ^  on indicator variables for 908 hedge funds in the TASS Hedge Fund Combined
(Live and Graveyard) database with at least ve years of returns history during the period
from November 1977 to January 2001, where the maximum likelihood estimators of the MA
coecients (0;1;2) are constrained to sum to 1. Absolute values of t-statistics are given
in parentheses. The indicator variables are OPEN (1 if the fund is open, 0 otherwise); the
fund categories (1 if the fund belongs to the category, 0 otherwise); USBASED (1 if the fund
is based in the US, 0 otherwise); and geographical focus categories (1 if the geographical
focus of the fund is in a given region, 0 otherwise, where the regions are USA, Asia Pacic,
Western Europe, Eastern Europe, and Africa, respectively).
58returns are given by the linear single-factor model (20) where the factor is the return on
the S&P 500 index. To the extent that this assumption is a poor approximation to the true
return-generating process, the corresponding smoothing parameter estimates will be 
awed
as well.
Table 12 reports the means and standard deviations of the estimates (^ 0; ^ 1; ^ 2) and ^ 
for each of the categories, as well as the Durbin-Watson statistic and the regression R2.
In contrast to the maximum likelihood estimates of Table 8, the regression estimates are
considerably more noisy, with cross-sectional standard deviations for the coecients that are
often an order of magnitude larger than the means, and in almost every case larger than the
standard deviations of Table 8. For example, the average ^ 0 for the Not Categorized category
is 0.659, but the standard deviation is 8.696. The mean of ^ 0 for Fixed-Income Directional
funds is  1:437 and the standard deviation is 6.398. These results are not unexpected given
the role that the linear single-factor model plays in the estimation process|if true returns
contain additional common factors, then the linear-regression approach (62) will yield biased
and inconsistent estimators for the smoothing parameters in (21){(23).
The R2 statistics in Table 12 yield some indication of the likelihood of omitted factors
among the dierent categories. The highest mean R2's are for the US Equity Hedge, Dedi-
cated Shortseller, and Convertible Fund (Long Only) categories, with values of 26.1%, 43.0%,
and 25.0%, respectively, which is consistent with the fact that our single factor is the S&P
500.40 However, several categories have mean R2's below 10%, implying relatively poor ex-
planatory power for the single-factor model and, therefore, noisy and unreliable estimates of
the smoothing process.
Overall, the results in Table 12 suggest that the linear regression approach is dominated
by the maximum likelihood procedure, and that while the regression coecients of lagged
market returns may provide some insight into the net market exposure of some funds, they
are considerably less useful for making inferences about illiquidity and smoothed returns.
6.4 Illiquidity Vs. Smoothing
To address the issue of systematic versus idiosyncratic eects of illiquidity and return-
smoothing, we estimate the more general linear factor model of smoothing (67){(69) with
k=3 for a group of 10 randomly selected convertible arbitrage funds from our sample of 908
funds.41 We take as our common factor t the CSFB/Tremont Convertible Arbitrage Index,
40We have omitted the Global Opportunity category from this comparison despite its R2 of 30.9% because
it contains only a single fund.
41In particular, we selected the rst 10 convertible arbitrage funds in our sample, ranked according to
TASS fund identiers.
59Category N
^ 0 ^ 1 ^ 2 ^  D.W. R2(%)
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
Not Categorized 111 0:659 8:696 0:459 9:363  0:118 2:260 167:540 1432:164 1:86 0:33 13:6 16:8
US Equity Hedge 162 0:695 1:502 0:094 0:415 0:211 1:220 4:427 38:503 1:80 0:28 26:1 17:5
European Equity Hedge 22 0:561 0:155 0:340 0:683 0:099 0:708 1:386 4:287 1:76 0:19 18:0 10:8
Asian Equity Hedge 5 0:405 0:252 0:323 0:179 0:272 0:088 0:425 0:086 1:82 0:24 7:4 4:5
Global Equity Hedge 27 0:846 0:400 0:057 0:331 0:097 0:364 1:115 0:913 1:65 0:22 22:1 19:8
Dedicated Shortseller 7 0:908 0:182 0:115 0:101  0:023 0:203 0:911 0:360 1:94 0:16 43:0 14:7
Fixed-Income Directional 13  1:437 6:398 4:385 14:552  1:948 8:179 320:099 1151:235 1:62 0:29 13:1 9:9
Convertible Fund (Long Only) 15 0:538 0:262 0:343 0:152 0:120 0:178 0:536 0:219 1:53 0:24 25:0 15:0
Event Driven 109 0:582 0:479 0:293 0:493 0:125 0:225 0:958 3:568 1:63 0:36 18:0 11:3
Non-Directional/Relative Value 85 0:643 4:057 0:895 2:321  0:538 4:761 45:493 244:844 1:62 0:46 12:2 9:2
Global Macro 24 0:558 0:349 0:194 0:341 0:247 0:190 0:674 0:409 1:76 0:28 13:5 8:0
Global Opportunity 1 0:619 | 0:191 | 0:191 | 0:455 | 1:55 | 30:9 |
Natural Resources 3 0:691 0:138 0:106 0:087 0:203 0:068 0:551 0:163 1:88 0:31 2:6 0:9
Pure Leveraged Currency 26  0:080 1:376 0:360 1:066 0:720 1:987 7:363 24:457 1:89 0:16 4:4 6:0
Pure Managed Futures 93  0:032 1:588 0:696 1:649 0:336 1:611 8:350 26:079 1:99 0:26 5:9 5:9
Pure Emerging Market 72 0:899 0:801 0:157 0:465  0:056 0:452 1:883 6:486 1:51 0:29 22:8 10:6
Pure Property 1 1:319 |  0:024 |  0:295 | 1:828 | 2:31 | 15:4 |
Fund of Funds 132 0:674 1:516  0:049 2:566 0:375 3:059 18:694 171:624 1:63 0:30 21:6 15:0
All 908 0:554 3:534 0:366 3:950 0:081 2:401 34:268 529:561 1:73 0:34 17:8 15:1





2 under the assumption of a linear single-factor model for Rt where the factor is the total return of the S&P
500 Index, for 908 hedge funds in the TASS Hedge Fund Combined (Live and Graveyard) database with at least ve years of
returns history during the period from November 1977 to January 2001.
6
0and estimate the linear regression equation via maximum likelihood and then renormalize
the MA coecients according to (69) and recompute the standard errors accordingly. Table
13 contains the regression coecients as well as the smoothing coecients, and t-statistics
are reported instead of standard errors because we have specic null hypotheses to test as
described in Section 5.2.
The estimates in Table 13 show that including a common factor can have a signicant
impact on the smoothing parameter estimates. For example, the value of ^ 0 for Fund 45
under the smoothing process (21){(23) is 0.648, and its t-statistic under the null hypothesis
that 0 =1 is 4.64. However, under the linear factor specication (67){(69), the smoothing
coecient estimate is 0.960 with a t-statistic of 0.05. Nevertheless, for other funds in our
sample of 10, the smoothing parameter estimates are virtually unchanged by including the
contemporaneous and lagged common factors. For example, the value of ^ 0 for Fund 171
under the smoothing process (21){(23) and the linear factor model (67){(69) is 0.536 and
0.533, respectively, with t-statistics of 11:46 and 10:33, respectively.
We see from Table 13 that the Convertible Arbitrage Index is statistically signicant for
several, but not all, of the 10 funds, and that its lags are signicant for only two funds, 1
and 34. For these two funds, the lagged-index coecients are negative in sign, which is not
consistent with the smoothing model (68){(69) (assuming that the funds' contemporaneous
factor loadings and smoothing parameters are positive). For Fund 1, the smoothing param-
eter estimate ^ 0 is still signicantly dierent from 1 even after accounting for the common
factor, but for Fund 34, it is not.
It is tempting to conclude from these results that the linear factor model (67){(69) is
capable of distinguishing between systematic illiquidity and idiosyncratic return-smoothing
behavior. For example, we might argue that those funds which continue to exhibit signicant
smoothing parameters ^ 0 even after accounting for common factors must be engaged in
return-smoothing behavior. However, several caveats must be kept in mind before reaching
such conclusions. First, we cannot be certain that the CSFB/Tremont Convertible Arbitrage
Index is the appropriate common factor for these funds, despite the TASS classication|
some funds may be involved in complex versions of convertible arbitrage while others are
engaged in plain-vanilla implementations.42 Regressing a fund's returns on a highly serially
correlated common factor that is not directly relevant to that fund's investment process
will, nevertheless, have an eect on the smoothing-parameter estimates ^ k, and the eect
42For example, TASS denes their \Convertible Fund (Long Only)" category as convertible arbitrage funds
that take only long positions. Funds that use convertible arbitrage strategies are also included in the \Fixed
Income" and \Non-Directional/Relative Value" categories in the TASS database. However, convertible
arbitrage in CSFB database involves all funds that use convertible arbitrage strategy, not only long-only
funds.
61may be in either direction depending on the relation between the common factor and the
fund's observed returns. Second, even if a common factor can account for much of the serial
correlation in a fund's observed returns, an explanation for the source of the factor's serial
correlation is still required|if the fund is a buy-and-hold version of the common factor, e.g.,
a fund-of-funds designed to replicate the CSFB/Tremont Convertible Arbitrage Index, then
it is of small comfort to investors in such a fund-of-funds that there is not much smoothing
in observed returns beyond what is already present in the common factor. And nally, no
econometric model can fully capture the many qualitative and often subjective characteristics
of a fund's investment process, and such information is likely to be of particular relevance
in distinguishing between illiquidity and smoothed returns at the fund level.
These caveats suggest that a more comprehensive econometric analysis of hedge-fund
returns may be worthwhile, with particular emphasis on constructing common factors for
hedge funds with similar investment mandates and processes. By developing a better under-
standing for the common risk exposures that certain hedge funds share, it may be possible
to dierentiate between systematic and idiosyncratic illiquidity and provide investors and
managers with a more rened set of tools with which to optimize their investment plans.
6.5 Smoothing-Adjusted Sharpe Ratio Estimates
For each of the 908 funds in our sample, we compute annual Sharpe ratios in three ways
relative to a benchmark return of 0: the standard method (
p
12 times the ratio of the mean
monthly return to the monthly return standard deviation), the serial-correlation-adjusted
method in Lo (2002), and the small-sample method described in Section 5.4. The results are
summarized in Table 14.
The largest dierences between standard and smoothing-adjusted Sharpe ratios are found
in the same categories that the smoothing-process estimates of Section 6.2 identied as
the most illiquid: Fixed-Income Directional (20.3% higher average Sharpe ratio relative
to SR
), Convertible Fund (Long Only) (17.8%), Non-Directional/Relative Value (16.0%),
Pure Emerging Market (16.3%), and Fund of Funds (17.8%). For two categories|Dedicated
Shortseller and Managed Futures|the bias is reversed, a result of negative serial correlation
in their returns. For the other categories, Table 14 shows that the smoothing-adjusted Sharpe
ratios are similar in magnitude to the usual estimates. These dierences across categories
suggest the importance of taking illiquidity and smoothed returns into account in evaluating
the performance of hedge funds.
62Code T Period ^  ^ 
0 ^ 
1 ^ 
2 Maximum Likelihood Smoothing Parameter Estimates
(t-stat) (t-stat) (t-stat) (t-stat) ^ 0 t(^ 0) ^ 1 t(^ 1) ^ 2 t(^ 2) ^ 
1 120 199101{200101  0:346 0:302 0:040  0:117 0:679 3:16 0:275 6:35 0:046 0:57 0:54
( 3:26) (5:37) (0:62) ( 2:10) 0:600 7:77 0:241 6:32 0:159 3:74 0:44
26 94 199303{200101  0:848 0:899 0:101  0:088 0:706 3:78 0:214 3:67 0:080 0:94 0:55
( 4:62) (13:72) (1:05) ( 0:73) 0:533 9:88 0:305 9:33 0:162 3:98 0:40
34 100 199209{200101  0:528 0:840  0:249 0:013 0:843 1:01 0:076 0:87 0:080 0:70 0:72
( 3:75) (9:30) ( 2:45) (0:14) 0:612 7:41 0:143 3:02 0:245 5:80 0:45
45 75 199004{199607  0:351 0:273 0:039  0:055 0:960 0:05 0:243 0:88  0:203  0:26 1:02
( 2:50) (1:44) (0:15) ( 0:31) 0:648 4:64 0:220 4:01 0:132 2:15 0:49
54 97 198807{199608  0:741 0:226  0:007 0:044 0:694 1:70 0:234 2:65 0:073 0:43 0:54
( 2:58) (0:95) ( 0:03) (0:22) 0:632 5:48 0:285 6:83 0:083 1:48 0:49
57 99 199210{200101  0:712 1:303  0:036  0:667 0:604 4:27 0:256 4:08 0:140 1:96 0:45
( 0:88) (3:26) ( 0:10) ( 1:89) 0:561 8:35 0:311 9:23 0:127 2:82 0:43
171 93 199304{200101  0:616 1:100  0:248  0:187 0:533 10:33 0:145 2:87 0:322 11:66 0:41
( 0:41) (1:88) ( 0:25) ( 0:33) 0:536 11:46 0:193 5:13 0:271 7:91 0:40
214 92 199305{200101  0:678 1:208  0:541  0:098 0:663 5:14 0:201 4:81 0:136 2:78 0:50
( 0:77) (3:15) ( 1:05) ( 0:20) 0:629 5:74 0:229 4:89 0:142 2:68 0:47
225 75 199004{199607  0:760 0:508 0:121 0:242 0:792 0:64 0:080 0:43 0:128 0:52 0:65
( 1:08) (0:96) (0:15) (0:40) 0:685 4:36 0:045 0:65 0:270 4:84 0:54
415 97 198807{199608  0:897 0:457  0:069 0:065 0:577 2:93 0:302 3:58 0:121 1:14 0:44
( 2:95) (2:24) ( 0:46) (0:35) 0:570 7:87 0:306 8:68 0:124 2:66 0:43





ut = 0t + 1t 1 + 2t 2, subject to the normalization 1 = 0 + 1 + 2, for 10 randomly selected convertible arbitrage funds
from the sample of 908 hedge funds in the TASS Hedge Fund Combined (Live and Graveyard) database with at least ve years
of returns history during the period from November 1977 to January 2001. The factor t is taken to be the CSFB/Tremont
Convertible Arbitrage Index. For comparison, maximum likelihood estimates of 0, 1, 2, and t-statistics from the MA(2)
smoothing process Ro
t = 0Rt +1Rt 1 +2Rt 2, subject to the normalization 1 = 0 +1 +2, are provided below each of the
main rows. t-statistics are computed with respect to the null hypothesis that the coecient is 0, except for ^ 0, for which the
null hypothesis 0 = 1 is used, hence the t-statistic is computed as (^ 0   1)=SE(^ 0).
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3Category




Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
Not Categorized 111 1:12 1:09 1:06 0:87 1:00 0:82
US Equity Hedge 162 1:26 0:75 1:31 0:75 1:23 0:69
European Equity Hedge 22 1:43 0:74 1:43 0:80 1:33 0:74
Asian Equity Hedge 5 0:50 0:39 0:52 0:39 0:49 0:37
Global Equity Hedge 27 0:90 0:61 0:95 0:66 0:89 0:61
Dedicated Shortseller 7 0:28 0:59 0:32 0:64 0:30 0:61
Fixed-Income Directional 13 2:02 2:35 1:80 2:23 1:68 2:06
Convertible Fund (Long Only) 15 1:83 1:20 1:66 0:85 1:55 0:80
Event Driven 109 2:36 1:45 2:21 1:57 2:08 1:47
Non-Directional/Relative Value 85 2:20 1:86 2:03 2:39 1:89 2:22
Global Macro 24 1:08 0:67 1:14 0:73 1:07 0:70
Global Opportunity 1  0:56 |  0:39 |  0:37 |
Natural Resources 3 0:60 0:25 0:56 0:23 0:52 0:21
Pure Leveraged Currency 26 0:63 0:49 0:65 0:50 0:61 0:47
Pure Managed Futures 93 0:54 0:55 0:63 0:60 0:60 0:56
Pure Emerging Market 72 0:39 0:45 0:36 0:44 0:34 0:40
Pure Property 1 0:42 | 0:45 | 0:41 |
Fund of Funds 132 1:44 1:01 1:30 0:88 1:22 0:82
All 908 1:32 1:24 1:27 1:27 1:19 1:18
Table 14: Means and standard deviations of Sharpe ratios of 908 hedge funds in the TASS
Hedge Fund Combined (Live and Graveyard) database with at least ve years of returns
history during the period from November 1977 to January 2001. SR is the standard Sharpe
ratio, SR
 is the smoothing-adjusted Sharpe ratio of Lo (2002), and SR
 is the smoothing-
adjusted Sharpe ratio using ^ NW. All Sharpe ratios are computed with respect to a 0
benchmark.
647 Conclusions
Although there are several potential explanations for serial correlation in asset returns, we
have argued in this paper that the serial correlation present in the returns of hedge funds
is due primarily to illiquidity and smoothed returns. Using a simple econometric model
in which observed returns are a nite moving-average of unobserved economic returns, we
are able to generate empirically realistic levels of serial correlation for historical hedge-fund
returns while, at the same time, explaining the ndings of Asness, Krail and Liew (2001)
regarding the signicance of lagged market returns in market-model regressions for hedge
funds. Although our moving-average specication is similar to some of the early models of
nonsynchronous trading, our motivation is quite dierent and is meant to cover a broader
set of factors that give rise to serial correlation and smoothed returns, even in the presence
of synchronously recorded prices.
Maximum likelihood estimates of our smoothing model for the returns of 908 hedge funds
in the TASS Hedge Fund database yield empirically plausible estimates of smoothing coe-
cients and suggest that simple time-series measures such as our smoothing index may serve
as useful proxies for a hedge fund's illiquidity risk exposure. In some cases, our econometric
model may also be useful for 
agging possible cases of deliberate performance-smoothing
behavior, although additional information will need to be gathered before any rm conclu-
sions regarding such behavior can be made. Regardless of the sources of serial correlation,
illiquidity exposure is the main implication and this has potentially important consequences
for both managers and investors. Therefore, we also develop a set of tools for quantify-
ing the degree of smoothing in the data and adjusting for smoothed returns in computing
performance statistics such as means, variances, and Sharpe ratios, and derive their asymp-
totic distributions using continuous-record asymptotics which address the small sample sizes
which typify hedge-fund datasets.
Our empirical results suggest several applications for our econometric model of illiquidity
and smoothed returns. Despite the general consistency of our empirical results with common
intuition regarding the levels of illiquidity among the various hedge-fund investment styles,
the variation in estimated smoothing coecients within each category indicates that there
may be better ways of categorizing hedge funds. Given the importance of liquidity for the
typical hedge-fund investor, it may be useful to subdivide each style category into \liquidity
tranches" dened by our smoothing index. Alternatively, our smoothing parameter estimates
may be used to compute illiquidity exposure measures for portfolios of hedge funds or fund
of funds, which may serve as the basis for a more systematic approach to managing portfolios
that include alternative investments.
65Although we have focused on hedge funds in this paper, our analysis may be applied to
other investment classes, especially to venture-capital and private-equity funds, for which
illiquidity and smoothed returns are even more problematic, and where the estimation of
smoothing proles can be particularly useful for providing investors with risk transparency.
More generally, our econometric model may be applied to a number of other contexts in
which there may be a gap between reported results and economic realities. For example,
recent events surrounding the collapse of Enron and other cases of corporate accounting
irregularities have created renewed concerns about \earnings management" in which certain
corporations are alleged to have abused accounting conventions so as to smooth earnings,
presumably to give the appearance of stability and consistent growth.43 The impact of such
smoothing can sometimes be \undone" using an econometric model such as ours.
Finally, there are a number of outstanding issues regarding our analysis of illiquidity
and smoothed returns. Perhaps the most pressing issue is whether the proximate source
of smoothing is inadvertent or deliberate. Our linear regression model with contemporane-
ous and lagged common factors may serve as the starting point for distinguishing between
systematic illiquidity versus idiosyncratic smoothing behavior. However, this issue is likely
to require additional information about each fund along the lines of Chandar and Bricker's
(2002) study, e.g., the size of the fund, the types of the securities in which the fund invests,
the accounting conventions used to mark the portfolio, the organization's compensation
structure, and other operational aspects of the fund. With these additional pieces of infor-
mation, we may construct more relevant common factors for our linear-regression framework,
or relate the cross-sectional variation in smoothing coecients to assets under management,
security type, fee structure, and other characteristics, yielding a more complete picture of
the sources of smoothed returns.
From the investors' perspective, the natural extension of our analysis is to model illiquid-
ity directly and quantify the illiquidity premium associated with each hedge-fund investment
style, perhaps in a linear-factor framework such as Chordia, Roll and Subrahmanyam (2000)
and Pastor and Stambaugh (2002). Whether such factor models can forecast liquidity crises
like August 1998, and whether there are \systematic" illiquidity factors that are common to
categories of hedge funds are open questions that are particularly important in the context
of hedge-fund investments. We hope to address these and other related questions in our
ongoing research.
43See Beneish (2001) and Healy and Wahlen (1999) for reviews of the extensive literature on earnings
management.
66A Appendix
Proofs of Propositions 3, 4, and 5 are provided in Sections A.1, A.2, and A.3, respectively.
Section A.4 provides denitions of the 17 categories from TASS, and Section A.5 contains
additional empirical results.
A.1 Proof of Proposition 3
The constraint (49) may be used to substitute out 0, hence we need only consider (1;2).
Now it is well known that in the standard MA(2) specication where the usual identication
condition is used in place of (49), i.e.,
Xt = t + at 1 + bt 2 ;
















1   b2 a(1   b)
a(1   b) 1   b2
#
: (A.2)
But under our normalization (49), there is a simple functional relation between (^ a;^ b) and
(^ 1; ^ 2):
^ 1 =
^ a
1 + ^ a +^ b
; ^ 2 =
^ b
1 + ^ a +^ b
: (A.3)















67where the matrix J is Jacobian associated with (A:3):
J =
1
(1 + a + b)2
"
1 + b  a







(1 + a + b)3
"
 (1 + b)( 1 + a   ab + b2) b( 1 + a   ab + b2)
b( 1 + a   ab + b2)  ( 1 + b)( 1 + a   ab + b2)
#
(A.6)
and solving for a and b as a function of 1 and 2 using (A:3) and substituting these expres-
sions into A:6 yields the desired result.
The process Xt is invertible if and only if the roots of characteristic polynomial
f(x) = 0x
2 + 1x + 2 (A.7)
lie inside the unit circle in the complex plane. It is easy to see that this is equivalent to the







z2 + 2(1   1   22)z + 1   21
(z   1)2 (A.8)
lie in the left half-plane (Samuelson, 1941, was perhaps the rst to state this result). Apply-
ing the Routh-Hurwitz necessary and sucient conditions to (A.8) then yields the desired
result.
A.2 Proof of Proposition 4
Theorem 1 [Herrndorf (1984)] If ftg satises the following assumptions:
(A1) E[t] =  for all t.
(A2) supt E[jt j] < 1 for some  > 2 .
(A3) 0 < 2















j < 1 : (A.9)








(j ) ) W(s) ; s 2 [0;1] (A.10)
where [ns] denotes the greater integer less than or equal to ns and `)' denotes weak conver-
gence.
With these results in hand, we are ready to prove Proposition 4. Let returns Rt be given by:
Rt = t (A.11)
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(m + 1   j)
T X
t=j+1




























(m + 1   j)
T X
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tt j = m(12 + 23 +  + T 1T) +
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= 1
 


















= 1(S2 + S3 +  + Sm+1)   m1S1 +  +
T m(ST m+1 +  + ST)   mT mST m +
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72and summing (A.17) and (A.37) yields the desired result.
A.3 Proof of Proposition 5
Given the weak convergence of ^ 
2
NW to the functional f(W) in (87), Proposition 5 is an
almost trivial consequence of the following well-known result:
Theorem 2 [Extended Continuous Mapping Theorem]44 Let hn and h be measurable map-
pings from D[0;1]|the space of all functions on [0;1] that are right continuous with left-hand
limits|to itself and denote by E the set of x 2 D[0;1] such that hn(xn) ! h(x) fails to hold
for some sequence xn converging to x. If Wn(s) ) W(s) and E is of Wiener-measure
zero, i.e. P(W 2 E) = 0, then hn(Wn) ) h(W).
A.4 TASS Fund Category Denitions
The following is a list of category descriptions, taken directly from TASS documentation,
that dene the criteria used by TASS in assigning funds in their database to one of 17
possible categories:
Equity Hedge This directional strategy involves equity-oriented investing on both the long and short sides
of the market. The objective is not to be market neutral. Managers have the ability to shift from
value to growth, from small to medium to large capitalization stocks, and from a net long position
to a net short position. Managers may use futures and options to hedge. The focus may be regional,
such as long/short US or European equity, or sector specic, such as long and short technology or
healthcare stocks. Long/short equity funds tend to build and hold portfolios that are substantially
more concentrated than those of traditional stock funds. US equity Hedge, European equity Hedge,
Asian equity Hedge and Global equity Hedge is the regional Focus.
Dedicated Short Seller Short biased managers take short positions in mostly equities and derivatives.
The short bias of a manager's portfolio must be constantly greater than zero to be classied in this
category.
Fixed Income Directional This directional strategy involves investing in Fixed Income markets only on
a directional basis.
Convertible Arbitrage This strategy is identied by hedge investing in the convertible securities of a
company. A typical investment is to be long the convertible bond and short the common stock of the
same company. Positions are designed to generate prots from the xed income security as well as
the short sale of stock, while protecting principal from market moves.
Event Driven This strategy is dened as `special situations' investing designed to capture price movement
generated by a signicant pending corporate event such as a merger, corporate restructuring, liquida-
tion, bankruptcy or reorganization. There are three popular sub-categories in event-driven strategies:
risk (merger) arbitrage, distressed/high yield securities, and Regulation D.
44See Billingsley (1968) for a proof.
73Non Directional/Relative Value This investment strategy is designed to exploit equity and/or xed
income market ineciencies and usually involves being simultaneously long and short matched market
portfolios of the same size within a country. Market neutral portfolios are designed to be either beta
or currency neutral, or both.
Global Macro Global macro managers carry long and short positions in any of the world's major capital
or derivative markets. These positions re
ect their views on overall market direction as in
uenced
by major economic trends and or events. The portfolios of these funds can include stocks, bonds,
currencies, and commodities in the form of cash or derivatives instruments. Most funds invest globally
in both developed and emerging markets.
Global Opportunity Global macro managers carry long and short positions in any of the world's major
capital or derivative markets on an opportunistic basis. These positions re
ect their views on overall
market direction as in
uenced by major economic trends and or events. The portfolios of these funds
can include stocks, bonds, currencies, and commodities in the form of cash or derivatives instruments.
Most funds invest globally in both developed and emerging markets.
Natural Resources This trading strategy has a focus for the natural resources around the world.
Leveraged Currency This strategy invests in currency markets around the world.
Managed Futures This strategy invests in listed nancial and commodity futures markets and currency
markets around the world. The managers are usually referred to as Commodity Trading Advisors, or
CTAs. Trading disciplines are generally systematic or discretionary. Systematic traders tend to use
price and market specic information (often technical) to make trading decisions, while discretionary
managers use a judgmental approach.
Emerging Markets This strategy involves equity or xed income investing in emerging markets around
the world.
Property The main focus of the investments are property.
Fund of Funds A `Multi Manager' fund will employ the services of two or more trading advisors or Hedge
Funds who will be allocated cash by the Trading Manager to trade on behalf of the fund.
A.5 Supplementary Empirical Results
In Tables A.1{A.7, we provide corresponding empirical results to Tables 7{14 but with Live
and Graveyard funds separated so that the eects of survivorship bias can be seen. Of
course, since we still apply our ve-year minimum returns history lter to both groups, there
is still some remaining survivorship bias. Tables A.1 and A.2 contain summary statistics for
the two groups of funds, Tables A.3 and A.4 report summary statistics for the maximum
likelihood estimates of the smoothing model (21){(23), Tables A.5 and A.6 report similar
statistics for the regression model estimates (62) of the smoothing model, and Table A.7
contains smoothing-adjusted Sharpe ratios for the two groups of funds. Finally, Table A.8
corresponds to the regressions of Table 11 but with dependent variables ^ 0 and ^  estimated
by maximum likelihood under the alternate constraint (75).
74Category N
Annual Mean Annual SD Skewness Kurtosis ^ 1(%) ^ 2(%) ^ 3(%) p-Value(Q)
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
Not Categorized 44 12:08 6:04 13:08 10:44 0:05 0:73 2:37 2:54 8:8 15:9 2:3 14:5 1:4 9:8 31:8 32:0
US Equity Hedge 139 23:53 10:92 21:86 11:95 0:20 0:98 3:79 4:89 8:0 13:7 0:7 11:4  4:1 11:2 33:0 29:0
European Equity Hedge 19 18:75 7:33 15:36 6:53 0:51 0:73 3:10 2:86 13:0 11:1 13:5 9:0  2:9 8:9 16:4 20:7
Asian Equity Hedge 5 9:16 7:96 21:13 6:64 0:50 0:85 2:32 0:73 11:7 13:0 5:0 5:6  5:4 13:4 40:2 21:1
Global Equity Hedge 24 15:04 7:67 18:28 6:31  0:16 1:06 4:17 5:83 10:5 9:9  0:6 8:8  4:1 5:4 41:8 26:9
Dedicated Shortseller 6  0:17 11:15 23:01 14:51 0:44 0:17 2:24 2:63 2:6 7:4  0:9 9:0  5:6 7:0 28:3 28:7
Fixed-Income Directional 12 10:17 3:39 9:80 9:08  1:00 1:33 5:78 7:49 22:8 15:8 14:9 13:4 1:7 14:1 17:6 21:8
Convertible Fund (Long Only) 12 14:05 5:54 11:67 7:39  0:26 1:88 7:16 10:93 22:9 11:9 5:3 14:9  1:0 11:9 15:2 22:1
Event Driven 97 15:61 6:42 8:96 6:66  0:58 1:74 8:10 11:71 20:0 16:6 5:8 13:2  0:9 12:1 25:2 28:6
Non-Directional/Relative Value 63 13:23 5:91 7:89 4:84  0:61 1:74 6:08 9:52 18:4 26:0 15:3 14:0 5:4 15:8 14:6 24:0
Global Macro 15 14:92 7:82 17:34 10:46 0:79 1:07 4:67 4:79 5:3 11:8  1:3 12:2  0:9 8:4 41:9 24:2
Global Opportunity 1  17:39 | 31:03 |  0:48 | 2:80 | 23:1 | 14:1 | 0:0 | 20:8 |
Natural Resources 1 14:49 | 18:42 | 0:30 |  0:14 |  10:1 |  1:6 | 7:8 | 40:6 |
Pure Leveraged Currency 15 10:36 5:23 15:27 6:25 0:81 0:75 3:22 4:04 7:4 8:7  3:3 9:9  3:1 7:1 31:2 18:7
Pure Managed Futures 28 10:54 6:19 16:46 7:62 0:42 1:55 5:92 12:20 0:9 13:2  4:1 11:4  2:5 8:6 32:4 29:9
Pure Emerging Market 54 9:08 10:21 26:12 11:66  0:56 1:21 4:97 5:86 18:3 12:0 4:1 11:9  1:7 9:2 30:7 29:4
Pure Property 1 3:96 | 9:41 |  1:33 | 5:43 |  23:1 | 2:3 | 7:3 | 18:9 |
Fund of Funds 115 11:45 4:95 10:16 5:75  0:29 1:27 4:83 6:17 17:3 14:0 6:2 11:7  1:2 9:1 26:5 27:9
All Live 651 14:88 9:33 15:05 10:65  0:15 1:36 5:00 7:63 13:7 16:5 4:6 13:1  1:2 11:1 28:0 28:3
Table A.1: Means and standard deviations of basic summary statistics for 651 hedge funds in the TASS Hedge Fund Live
database with at least ve years of returns history during the period from November 1977 to January 2001. The columns




Annual Mean Annual SD Skewness Kurtosis ^ 1(%) ^ 2(%) ^ 3(%) p-Value(Q)
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
Not Categorized 67 9:92 7:48 17:26 11:52 0:17 1:23 4:53 5:88 3:4 17:5  0:1 14:9  0:1 12:4 39:0 29:2
US Equity Hedge 23 16:47 7:82 20:68 9:67 0:03 0:83 3:97 5:90 7:2 12:5 0:4 9:7  5:3 10:1 38:9 27:6
European Equity Hedge 3 13:33 3:85 10:58 4:17  0:38 1:06 2:15 1:89 10:5 11:7  3:7 14:8 3:8 7:6 51:4 9:1
Asian Equity Hedge | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
Global Equity Hedge 3 3:06 7:16 10:41 5:29  0:88 0:97 2:29 3:48 27:5 12:9 3:2 16:9 7:8 12:4 42:2 36:6
Dedicated Shortseller 1 3:32 | 12:78 | 0:78 | 2:46 | 15:5 |  13:5 |  12:0 | 52:4 |
Fixed-Income Directional 1 5:58 | 6:49 |  0:15 | 0:50 | 7:7 | 4:2 | 4:1 | 24:0 |
Convertible Fund (Long Only) 3 18:55 2:34 8:48 2:77 0:09 0:31 2:05 2:71 20:8 16:5 9:7 4:5  6:5 16:7 25:2 40:7
Event Driven 12 13:22 8:67 13:98 22:43  0:66 2:45 9:55 11:85 26:6 17:8 11:4 14:8 5:9 13:1 29:7 37:5
Non-Directional/Relative Value 22 10:58 8:26 9:02 5:67  1:18 1:61 7:47 9:56 17:8 14:5 3:5 16:3 3:9 10:4 24:4 26:8
Global Macro 10 19:49 7:70 21:29 7:83 0:14 0:86 4:64 9:40 10:1 19:2 1:6 8:7  0:8 8:0 20:6 13:3
Global Opportunity | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
Natural Resources 2 9:84 5:78 19:15 1:38 0:56 0:59 1:95 1:24 12:5 9:0 13:6 11:9  1:0 6:7 51:1 61:2
Pure Leveraged Currency 11 7:83 9:18 19:78 11:48  0:07 1:28 3:90 6:13 2:2 8:2  10:1 7:8  6:1 9:3 41:4 34:8
Pure Managed Futures 65 9:19 10:35 24:02 19:41 0:13 1:25 4:51 5:98  0:6 12:9  3:7 9:4  3:9 11:5 36:7 28:9
Pure Emerging Market 18 11:06 13:11 28:05 21:07  1:08 2:12 9:79 12:04 20:2 11:6 5:1 10:9  0:7 8:4 38:1 34:0
Pure Property | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
Fund of Funds 17 8:24 5:82 9:50 4:87  0:04 1:53 4:39 6:25 19:2 14:6 2:2 9:6 2:9 10:2 24:6 24:9
All Graveyard 258 10:80 9:17 18:61 15:21  0:14 1:45 5:17 7:40 8:2 16:8 0:2 12:7  1:0 11:4 35:2 29:3
Table A.2: Means and standard deviations of basic summary statistics for 258 hedge funds in the TASS Hedge Fund Graveyard
database with at least ve years of returns history during the period from November 1977 to January 2001. The columns




MA(2) with Constrained Sum MA(2) with Constrained 
^ 0 ^ 1 ^ 2 ^  ^ 0 ^ 1 ^ 2 ^ 
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
Not Categorized 44 0:973 0:273 0:049 0:149  0:023 0:174 1:075 0:704 0:942 0:269 0:046 0:145  0:015 0:160 1:006 0:584
US Equity Hedge 139 0:951 0:213 0:065 0:159  0:016 0:156 1:004 0:562 0:974 0:194 0:071 0:147  0:008 0:151 1:035 0:416
European Equity Hedge 19 0:790 0:115 0:077 0:088 0:133 0:073 0:673 0:196 0:902 0:170 0:096 0:101 0:156 0:095 0:893 0:317
Asian Equity Hedge 5 0:942 0:296 0:053 0:188 0:005 0:109 0:998 0:712 0:904 0:198 0:064 0:167 0:013 0:096 0:883 0:404
Global Equity Hedge 24 0:926 0:143 0:095 0:091  0:020 0:099 0:903 0:271 0:994 0:173 0:100 0:098  0:018 0:100 1:045 0:346
Dedicated Shortseller 6 1:031 0:220 0:008 0:109  0:039 0:135 1:131 0:528 1:149 0:152 0:024 0:115  0:031 0:142 1:368 0:363
Fixed-Income Directional 12 0:752 0:177 0:160 0:105 0:088 0:126 0:652 0:280 0:733 0:203 0:157 0:104 0:093 0:128 0:633 0:303
Convertible Fund (Long Only) 12 0:868 0:392 0:189 0:069  0:057 0:387 1:074 1:516 0:896 0:300 0:202 0:086  0:027 0:263 0:997 0:650
Event Driven 97 0:816 0:170 0:148 0:128 0:036 0:115 0:747 0:285 0:856 0:240 0:154 0:126 0:038 0:113 0:842 0:439
Non-Directional/Relative Value 63 0:809 0:253 0:077 0:279 0:114 0:133 0:831 0:697 0:764 0:296 0:070 0:275 0:110 0:127 0:777 0:793
Global Macro 15 1:006 0:186 0:046 0:115  0:053 0:168 1:088 0:422 1:054 0:214 0:052 0:120  0:049 0:188 1:205 0:525
Global Opportunity 1 0:737 | 0:162 | 0:100 | 0:580 | 0:632 | 0:139 | 0:086 | 0:426 |
Natural Resources 1 1:111 |  0:113 | 0:003 | 1:246 | 0:861 |  0:088 | 0:002 | 0:748 |
Pure Leveraged Currency 15 0:970 0:132 0:074 0:091  0:044 0:121 0:986 0:271 0:926 0:099 0:076 0:084  0:035 0:115 0:892 0:186
Pure Managed Futures 28 1:138 0:305  0:034 0:171  0:104 0:219 1:470 0:904 1:129 0:253  0:030 0:165  0:090 0:190 1:406 0:621
Pure Emerging Market 54 0:836 0:165 0:148 0:087 0:016 0:139 0:774 0:328 0:797 0:162 0:141 0:082 0:021 0:136 0:706 0:296
Pure Property 1 1:232 |  0:306 | 0:074 | 1:618 | 0:951 |  0:236 | 0:057 | 0:963 |
Fund of Funds 115 0:848 0:220 0:119 0:132 0:034 0:136 0:817 0:522 0:859 0:232 0:122 0:126 0:035 0:133 0:841 0:470
All 651 0:891 0:231 0:093 0:160 0:016 0:158 0:906 0:578 0:899 0:242 0:096 0:155 0:021 0:148 0:923 0:512
Table A.3: Means and standard deviations of maximum likelihood estimates of MA(2) smoothing process Ro
t = 0Rt+1Rt 1+
2Rt 2,   2
0 +2
1 +2
2, for 651 funds in the TASS Hedge Fund Live database with at least ve years of returns history during
the period from November 1977 to January 2001.
7
7Category N
MA(2) with Constrained Sum MA(2) with Constrained 
^ 0 ^ 1 ^ 2 ^  ^ 0 ^ 1 ^ 2 ^ 
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
Not Categorized 67 1:079 0:353  0:009 0:194  0:070 0:267 1:399 1:226 0:993 0:268  0:007 0:165  0:049 0:214 1:130 0:613
US Equity Hedge 23 0:945 0:179 0:053 0:113 0:002 0:115 0:951 0:363 0:993 0:212 0:065 0:126 0:000 0:123 1:063 0:471
European Equity Hedge 3 0:984 0:251 0:073 0:107  0:057 0:147 1:041 0:544 0:859 0:201 0:065 0:094  0:049 0:127 0:788 0:378
Asian Equity Hedge 0 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
Global Equity Hedge 3 0:790 0:099 0:220 0:043  0:011 0:057 0:683 0:131 0:670 0:196 0:179 0:003  0:014 0:044 0:508 0:242
Dedicated Shortseller 1 0:999 | 0:166 |  0:165 | 1:052 | 1:035 | 0:172 |  0:171 | 1:131 |
Fixed-Income Directional 1 0:902 | 0:064 | 0:033 | 0:820 | 0:977 | 0:069 | 0:036 | 0:961 |
Convertible Fund (Long Only) 3 0:753 0:121 0:138 0:113 0:109 0:013 0:617 0:166 0:885 0:062 0:182 0:155 0:131 0:033 0:854 0:158
Event Driven 12 0:761 0:174 0:184 0:135 0:055 0:101 0:670 0:286 0:740 0:270 0:166 0:115 0:058 0:099 0:666 0:438
Non-Directional/Relative Value 22 0:844 0:196 0:142 0:099 0:014 0:137 0:796 0:317 0:768 0:203 0:135 0:101 0:014 0:127 0:673 0:332
Global Macro 9 0:869 0:155 0:135 0:061  0:005 0:126 0:813 0:302 0:818 0:188 0:123 0:050  0:002 0:124 0:732 0:351
Global Opportunity 0 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
Natural Resources 2 0:811 0:115 0:079 0:030 0:110 0:085 0:687 0:164 0:845 0:050 0:084 0:039 0:119 0:099 0:741 0:055
Pure Leveraged Currency 11 1:272 0:446  0:024 0:147  0:248 0:331 1:980 2:016 1:107 0:163 0:000 0:107  0:183 0:169 1:319 0:424
Pure Managed Futures 65 1:129 0:325  0:053 0:233  0:076 0:159 1:467 1:295 1:082 0:244  0:037 0:193  0:066 0:144 1:292 0:642
Pure Emerging Market 18 0:817 0:148 0:154 0:085 0:029 0:109 0:730 0:254 0:789 0:181 0:145 0:078 0:028 0:107 0:692 0:313
Pure Property 0 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
Fund of Funds 17 0:845 0:165 0:168 0:103  0:013 0:107 0:789 0:250 0:823 0:208 0:158 0:090  0:012 0:106 0:761 0:324
All 257 1:001 0:314 0:042 0:190  0:042 0:196 1:177 1:064 0:950 0:259 0:046 0:164  0:031 0:162 1:025 0:569
Table A.4: Means and standard deviations of maximum likelihood estimates of MA(2) smoothing process Ro
t = 0Rt+1Rt 1+
2Rt 2,   2
0 +2
1 +2
2, for 257 funds in the TASS Hedge Fund Graveyard database with at least ve years of returns history
during the period from November 1977 to January 2001.
7
8Category N
^ 0 ^ 1 ^ 2 ^  D.W. R2(%)
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
Not Categorized 44 1:598 4:141  0:613 3:212 0:015 2:294 34:919 108:677 1:81 0:32 15:0 13:9
US Equity Hedge 139 0:713 1:557 0:080 0:433 0:207 1:268 4:747 41:449 1:80 0:28 24:8 17:4
European Equity Hedge 19 0:581 0:113 0:344 0:735 0:075 0:756 1:527 4:614 1:76 0:19 18:0 9:3
Asian Equity Hedge 5 0:405 0:252 0:323 0:179 0:272 0:088 0:425 0:086 1:82 0:24 7:4 4:5
Global Equity Hedge 24 0:913 0:323 0:028 0:331 0:059 0:354 1:163 0:956 1:69 0:20 24:3 19:9
Dedicated Shortseller 6 0:886 0:189 0:104 0:106 0:010 0:202 0:869 0:376 1:96 0:17 41:1 15:0
Fixed-Income Directional 12  1:495 6:678 4:689 15:156  2:193 8:493 346:600 1198:277 1:61 0:30 14:1 9:7
Convertible Fund (Long Only) 12 0:513 0:239 0:354 0:160 0:133 0:162 0:506 0:152 1:51 0:22 23:8 15:2
Event Driven 97 0:550 0:279 0:330 0:288 0:120 0:232 0:638 0:661 1:64 0:36 18:0 11:4
Non-Directional/Relative Value 63 0:607 2:010 0:762 1:808  0:369 3:342 19:268 80:833 1:63 0:51 12:7 9:5
Global Macro 15 0:541 0:428 0:182 0:424 0:277 0:161 0:765 0:491 1:84 0:29 12:0 7:0
Global Opportunity 1 0:619 | 0:191 | 0:191 | 0:455 | 1:55 | 30:9 |
Natural Resources 1 0:640 | 0:175 | 0:186 | 0:474 | 2:20 | 2:3 |
Pure Leveraged Currency 15 0:049 1:238 0:596 0:971 0:354 1:241 4:234 10:045 1:85 0:15 4:7 7:4
Pure Managed Futures 28  0:290 1:930 0:776 2:494 0:514 2:027 14:502 41:277 1:96 0:26 3:8 3:4
Pure Emerging Market 54 0:928 0:916 0:125 0:527  0:053 0:506 2:226 7:470 1:52 0:28 22:0 10:8
Pure Property 1 1:319 |  0:024 |  0:295 | 1:828 | 2:31 | 15:4 |
Fund of Funds 115 0:616 1:287  0:070 2:694 0:454 3:231 19:776 183:336 1:63 0:30 22:0 14:8
All 651 0:636 1:888 0:256 2:649 0:109 2:284 16:252 184:926 1:71 0:34 19:1 14:7
Table A.5: Means and standard deviations of linear regression estimates of MA(2) smoothing process Ro
t = 0Rt + 1Rt 1 +
2Rt 2,   2
0 +2
1 + 2
2 under the assumption of a linear single-factor model for Rt where the factor is the total return of the
S&P 500 Index, for 651 hedge funds in the TASS Hedge Fund Live database with at least ve years of returns history during
the period from November 1977 to January 2001.
7
9Category N
^ 0 ^ 1 ^ 2 ^  D.W. R2(%)
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
Not Categorized 67 0:042 10:672 1:163 11:752  0:206 2:251 254:635 1841:566 1:89 0:33 12:6 18:5
US Equity Hedge 23 0:586 1:129 0:182 0:266 0:232 0:900 2:492 8:220 1:81 0:26 33:8 16:6
European Equity Hedge 3 0:434 0:329 0:312 0:173 0:254 0:275 0:493 0:173 1:78 0:17 18:3 21:0
Asian Equity Hedge | | | | | | | | | | | | |
Global Equity Hedge 3 0:308 0:626 0:294 0:271 0:397 0:361 0:737 0:293 1:40 0:26 4:1 1:3
Dedicated Shortseller 1 1:040 | 0:176 |  0:216 | 1:159 | 1:84 | 54:7 |
Fixed-Income Directional 1  0:738 | 0:748 | 0:990 | 2:084 | 1:83 | 1:6 |
Convertible Fund (Long Only) 3 0:636 0:383 0:295 0:127 0:068 0:272 0:655 0:428 1:63 0:32 30:1 16:3
Event Driven 12 0:837 1:223  0:008 1:244 0:171 0:159 3:543 10:629 1:50 0:38 18:1 11:0
Non-Directional/Relative Value 22 0:748 7:341 1:275 3:420  1:023 7:574 120:592 461:012 1:59 0:28 10:5 8:2
Global Macro 9 0:587 0:173 0:214 0:139 0:198 0:234 0:522 0:138 1:63 0:22 16:0 9:3
Global Opportunity | | | | | | | | | | | | |
Natural Resources 2 0:717 0:184 0:072 0:089 0:211 0:095 0:589 0:211 1:71 0:19 2:7 1:2
Pure Leveraged Currency 11  0:255 1:590 0:037 1:150 1:218 2:690 11:631 36:324 1:95 0:16 4:0 3:5
Pure Managed Futures 65 0:079 1:418 0:662 1:132 0:260 1:406 5:700 15:336 2:00 0:26 6:8 6:5
Pure Emerging Market 18 0:811 0:231 0:256 0:151  0:067 0:237 0:852 0:460 1:46 0:30 24:9 9:8
Pure Property | | | | | | | | | | | | |
Fund of Funds 17 1:064 2:613 0:093 1:469  0:158 1:366 11:379 40:134 1:59 0:30 19:1 17:0
All 257 0:346 5:928 0:643 6:112 0:010 2:680 79:904 950:698 1:80 0:34 14:4 15:6
Table A.6: Means and standard deviations of linear regression estimates of MA(2) smoothing process Ro
t = 0Rt + 1Rt 1 +
2Rt 2,   2
0 +2
1 + 2
2 under the assumption of a linear single-factor model for Rt where the factor is the total return of the
S&P 500 Index, for 257 hedge funds in the TASS Hedge Fund Graveyard database with at least ve years of returns history
during the period from November 1977 to January 2001.
8
0Category
Sharpe Ratios For Live Funds Sharpe Ratios For Graveyard Funds
N SR SR SR
N SR SR SR
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
Not Categorized 44 1:55 1:34 1:41 1:00 1:33 0:94 67 0:84 0:79 0:83 0:70 0:77 0:65
US Equity Hedge 139 1:31 0:77 1:36 0:76 1:27 0:70 23 0:99 0:54 1:06 0:60 1:00 0:57
European Equity Hedge 19 1:44 0:78 1:46 0:85 1:36 0:78 3 1:36 0:57 1:26 0:49 1:18 0:46
Asian Equity Hedge 5 0:50 0:39 0:52 0:39 0:49 0:37 0 | | | | | |
Global Equity Hedge 24 0:95 0:60 1:00 0:66 0:94 0:61 3 0:55 0:75 0:51 0:59 0:48 0:55
Dedicated Shortseller 6 0:28 0:65 0:33 0:70 0:31 0:67 1 0:26 | 0:30 | 0:28 |
Fixed-Income Directional 12 2:11 2:42 1:87 2:31 1:75 2:14 1 0:86 | 0:87 | 0:84 |
Convertible Fund (Long Only) 12 1:67 1:18 1:48 0:72 1:38 0:69 3 2:45 1:26 2:39 1:07 2:23 1:00
Event Driven 97 2:45 1:46 2:31 1:58 2:17 1:47 12 1:61 1:16 1:47 1:39 1:37 1:29
Non-Directional/Relative Value 63 2:36 1:82 2:21 2:52 2:06 2:35 22 1:73 1:93 1:53 1:91 1:42 1:76
Global Macro 15 1:12 0:77 1:30 0:86 1:22 0:82 9 1:02 0:51 0:87 0:34 0:82 0:32
Global Opportunity 1  0:56 |  0:39 |  0:37 | 0 | | | | | |
Natural Resources 1 0:79 | 0:75 | 0:69 | 2 0:50 0:27 0:46 0:23 0:43 0:22
Pure Leveraged Currency 15 0:83 0:50 0:83 0:50 0:78 0:47 11 0:35 0:32 0:41 0:39 0:38 0:37
Pure Managed Futures 28 0:81 0:71 0:92 0:66 0:87 0:63 65 0:43 0:43 0:51 0:52 0:48 0:49
Pure Emerging Market 54 0:39 0:48 0:37 0:48 0:34 0:44 18 0:39 0:36 0:34 0:30 0:32 0:27
Pure Property 1 0:42 | 0:45 | 0:41 | 0 | | | | | |
Fund of Funds 115 1:48 1:02 1:35 0:90 1:27 0:83 17 1:15 0:98 0:95 0:70 0:89 0:65
All 651 1:50 1:29 1:45 1:35 1:36 1:26 257 0:85 0:95 0:83 0:90 0:78 0:84
Table A.7: Means and standard deviations of Sharpe ratios of 651 funds in the TASS Hedge Funds Live database and 257
funds in the TASS Hedge Fund Graveyard database, both with at least ve years of returns history during the period from
November 1977 to January 2001. SR is the standard Sharpe ratio, SR
 is the smoothing-adjusted Sharpe ratio of Lo (2002),
and SR
 is the smoothing-adjusted Sharpe ratio using ^ NW. All Sharpe ratios are computed with respect to a 0 benchmark.
8
1Regressor ^ 0 ^  ^ 0 ^ 
Constant 1:007 1:152 1:029 1:212
(42:02) (21:91) (35:56) (19:04)
US Equity Hedge 0:020  0:009 0:026  0:004
(0:69) (0:15) (0:85) (0:07)
European Equity Hedge  0:063  0:175  0:120  0:281
(1:19) (1:50) (1:97) (2:10)
Asian Equity Hedge  0:054  0:167  0:030  0:131
(0:52) (0:73) (0:28) (0:54)
Global Equity Hedge 0:005  0:053 0:032 0:006
(0:11) (0:49) (0:64) (0:05)
Dedicated Shortseller 0:178 0:291 0:184 0:293
(2:01) (1:50) (2:06) (1:49)
Fixed-Income Directional  0:203  0:386  0:196  0:375
(3:04) (2:63) (2:92) (2:54)
Convertible Fund (Long Only)  0:060  0:073  0:064  0:086
(0:95) (0:53) (1:01) (0:62)
Event Driven  0:116  0:228  0:124  0:247
(3:74) (3:36) (3:85) (3:49)
Non-Directional/Relative Value  0:194  0:303  0:180  0:281
(5:88) (4:18) (5:26) (3:73)
Global Macro 0:004  0:029 0:034 0:026
(0:09) (0:26) (0:63) (0:22)
Global Opportunity  0:314  0:598  0:309  0:59
(1:37) (1:19) (1:35) (1:18)
Natural Resources  0:096  0:281  0:095  0:284
(0:72) (0:96) (0:72) (0:97)
Pure Leveraged Currency 0:042 0:019 0:045 0:022
(0:85) (0:17) (0:89) (0:20)
Pure Managed Futures 0:133 0:267 0:142 0:284
(4:16) (3:78) (4:25) (3:87)
Pure Emerging Market  0:161  0:344  0:146  0:311
(4:63) (4:50) (3:53) (3:42)
Pure Property  0:056  0:190  0:028  0:146
(0:25) (0:38) (0:12) (0:29)
Fund of Funds  0:099  0:211  0:092  0:199
(3:32) (3:21) (3:03) (2:96)
OPEN  0:061  0:128  0:055  0:118















Sample Size 908 908 891 891
Adjusted R2(%) 15.7 11.4 16.9 12.6
Table A.8: Regressions of maximum likelihood estimated smoothing coecient ^ 0 and
smoothing index ^  on indicator variables for 908 hedge funds in the TASS Hedge Fund
Combined (Live and Graveyard) database with at least ve years of returns history during
the period from November 1977 to January 2001, where the maximum likelihood estimator
^  is constrained to equal a nonparametric estimator ~  of the innovation standard deviation.
Absolute values of t-statistics are given in parentheses. The indicator variables are OPEN (1
if the fund is open, 0 otherwise); the fund categories (1 if the fund belongs to the category, 0
otherwise); USBASED (1 if the fund is based in the US, 0 otherwise); and geographical focus
categories (1 if the geographical focus of the fund is in a given region, 0 otherwise, where the
regions are USA, Asia Pacic, Western Europe, Eastern Europe, and Africa, respectively).
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